A SOVIET WEEKLY OF WORLD AFFAIRS

SEEKING POLITICAL ASYLUM

NEW TIMES

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THE FOURTH WORLD-TITLE MATCH

HERMOD LANNUNG'S REVOLUTIONARY ODYSSEY

1917–1987

TIME AND PEOPLE

"This is the end of the Polish people as a political entity. From now on it will be no more than a workforce.... We shall see to it that the very idea of Poland as such is oblite-



Italian partisans in Turin. April 1945.

The 1st Division of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia fighting on a sector of the Srem front. February 1945 (top).
In the streets of Prague, which rose against the occupiers. May 1945.

rated for ever," said the head of the "Governorship-General," as the nazis called occupied Poland during World War II. But time and the people decided otherwise.

The crushing blows delivered by the Soviet army near Moscow and Leningrad sparked off a powerful partisan war in the occupied countries. A strong wave of resistance spread through Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia, the popular liberation struggle started as early as June 1941. Towards the end of 1942, the patriots had freed more than 40 towns, and controlled large territories in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1944, the Yugoslavian army already numbered 800 thousand men.

200 thousand French partisans would not permit the nazis to act with impunity in the departments of Savoy, Upper Savoy, and Correze, while patriots single-handedly liberated Corsica.

In Bulgaria, strikes spread all over the country. The Popular Liberation Insurrection Army launched an all-out offensive.... The men of the First Czechoslovak Army Corps went ahead to the Dukla Pass and advanced on Prague, which became the centre of the uprising of May 1945 in Czechia.



The national flag of Poland flies over liberated Warsaw. January 1945.

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

41

October 19,1987
Founded 1943

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

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

An international space forum is just over in Moscow. It drew scientists from almost 30 countries who discussed prospects of space research.

Photo: Martin John Rees (Britain), Cornelis de Jager (Holland) and Yakov Zeldovich (U.S.S.R.)

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FROM OUR MAILBAG

I am not given to excessive optimism. Had anyone told me some two or three years ago that an agreement of this kind was possible, I would have shrugged the idea off. But now this became a reality: Moscow and Washington agreed on scrapping a part of their missiles and I am hopefully looking forward to new steps in this direction.

M. TARASOVA
Volgograd, U.S.S.R.

A great deal is being said and written in my country about the process of renovation going on in the Soviet Union. Your mass media are accused of having suppressed or shelved certain news in the past. Our own problems, however, are simply glossed over. Recently, for instance, a national demonstration took place here on the eve of the Big Seven's summit in Venice. Taking part in the demonstration were thousands of workers, students, and people of most different views protesting against the presence of U.S. missiles in Europe, against the "star wars," arms trade, and so on. As was only to be expected, practically no Italian paper as much as mentioned the demonstration, as if it had never taken place. What right have we to criticize others then!

LUCA RICALDONE
Milan, Italy

The fate of the world and the progress of the disarmament campaign depend on our own dynamic socio-economic development, on the political stability of socialism. This is why one of the G.D.R. working people's chief slogans is: "My workplace is my battle station in the fight for peace!"

HANS-DIETER GEISSLER,
Leipzig, G.D.R.

EDITORIAL

A YEAR AFTER REYKJAVIK

The Reykjavik summit was a sensation. And as time goes on it continues to spring fresh surprises.

The announcement that the two leaders would meet in the Icelandic capital, midway between Moscow and Washington, was a sensation.

The course of the two-day talks when, to the surprise of both sides, complex world political problems were unravelled one after another, was a sensation.

And, against the background of an accord that seemed within reach, the fact that the meeting drew a blank-cold farewell exchanged by the participants and general disappointment - was a sensation too.

With hindsight, the outcome could hardly have been different. The inertia of years of fierce confrontation could not have given way to good will and trust overnight. This would have been a miracle, not a sensation.

But if today, a year later, we are on the threshold of major decisions on real cutbacks in nuclear weapons, the credit must go to Reykjavik.

The Soviet package, which included the elimination of medium-range missiles, a 50 per cent cut in strategic arsenals over five years, and a 100 per cent cut over ten years, safeguards against "star wars" and an end to nuclear testing - this package, which offered the fullest and quickest solution to the problems of the nuclear age, did not reach the mark at the time. The West brushed it off with President Reagan's hand. A setback for the idea? Yes. But as it turned out, it was a very fruitful setback.

Now, a year later, a Soviet-American agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles is within reach. An agreement on a 50 per cent cut in strategic arsenals may well be on the agenda in 1988. Full-scale negotiations are getting under way with the eventual aim of stopping nuclear tests. Even on the issue of space weapons, where the positions of the sides are particularly far apart, there are signs of progress: the sides are less inclined to use the language of ultimatum, and are putting out feelers: what exactly is meant by such notions as "research," "testing," etc. Perhaps here too there is some hope and a realistic compromise is possible?

The strategic idea of the Soviet package had nothing to do with linkage, as might have appeared at first sight (linkage is a tactic, a negotiating move, a sign of well-meaning impatience). The idea of the package is far more ambitious: nuclear détente and complete nuclear disarmament. A year after Reykjavik the idea is working.

Yes, regrettable though it is, Reykjavik was unable to produce an instant result. Revelations may happen in politics, but not transformations. Those who think in terms of "Empires of Evil" cannot turn into "Presidents of Good" in two days. Adopting new thinking is a complex and contradictory process. Its progress over the past year gives cause for rejoicing.

In our view, two lessons stand out: the lesson of idealism and the lesson of realism.

The lesson of idealism is the presence of a lofty goal, the goal of a nuclear-free world. Some call it a utopia. But it is a working and workable utopia. Without it, what is becoming possible now would never have been possible.

The lesson in realism consists in the ability to choose the required and dignified means, to meet the partner halfway, to overcome old dogmas and once popular slogans. It is the ability to renounce words in favour of deeds.

All these are the lessons of Reykjavik.

EXCHANGING IDEAS

If two people exchange apples, neither will be any the richer for it. But if they exchange ideas, each becomes wiser. Such, in a nutshell, is the message of the international forum Cooperation in Space for Peace on Earth held recently in Moscow.

The Moscow Space Forum, held on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the launching of the world's first artificial earth satellite, drew about 900 Soviet and foreign scientists. A model of the satellite hung suspended over the Forum's platform, its mirror-smooth spherical surface throwing back patches of bright electric light. It reminded the audience of the landmarks in the history of the space era its prototype had ushered in: Gagarin's flight, the Apollo trip to the Moon, the launchings of orbital stations, the Shuttle mission, and the probing of Venus. All the past achievements, however, merely provided the background for discussions centering on the future of space research, space technology and cosmonautics as envisaged today, with the space era in its thirty-first year. What is man to expect in the next thirty years? We put this question to **Alexei Leonov.**

"In the next thirty years I expect a manned flight to Mars," he said.

"Who is going to carry it out?"

"Hard to tell yet. It'll be a tall order. The ship will take eight months to reach Mars and as long to get back, and the crew will probably stay there for five months or so. I think this project calls for joint efforts and a pooling of resources."

"You mean we've got to work with the Americans!"

"Not just them. If the Europeans and the Japanese, with their technology and money, join in as well, the project will certainly be a realistic proposition."

The Forum heard many other forecasts and projects of the most fantastic kind. The breath-taking plans for the future of space exploration can only be carried out by joint efforts, scientists from various countries who addressed the Forum pointed out. No state, even a highly industrialized one, is now in a position to engage in full-scale space exploration single-handed.

On the other hand, however, the sphere of space research is highly specific. First, this research is closely linked with military projects (top-secret, for the most part). Secondly, cosmonautics is a matter of national prestige and pride, and every nation naturally seeks to take the lead, to outstrip others. Could this interfere with disinterested and fruitful cooperation?

Academician Vitaly Goldansky:

"Only peaceful space exploration can be considered prestigious, I'm sure. Who could match Gagarin and Armstrong in popularity in their time? More recently, recall the enthusiasm the carrying out of the Vega project aroused the world over. Incidentally, the project was a vivid example of international cooperation in space research."

Alexei Leonov:

"We are prepared to show the Americans anything they are interested in. On a reciprocal basis, that is. However, they haven't shown much enthusiasm for such an exchange of information - so far, at any rate. This Forum might be of help in breaking down the barriers of prejudice. It has brought to Moscow many American astronauts and scientists, including NASA representatives who were not too anxious to cooperate with us after the Soyuz-Apollo flight."

Following a joint plenary session, the Forum's participants broke up into round-table panels - or, to be more precise, working groups, because their members actually worked: they put their heads together in search of solutions to various scientific problems, argued, and exchanged data, with figures and formulas, enigmatic to the uninitiated, kaleidoscoping on visual display screens.

The Exploration of the Solar System section discussed plans for a trip to Mars. Photographs taken by the U.S.-launched Viking space probe were projected onto a screen, and an American scientist provided explanations. A Soviet colleague of his dwelt on the Marsokhod (Mars

Minoru Oda (Japan), Katau Sullivan (U.S.A.) and R. Neri (Mexico).

Photos by A. Tyagny-Ryadno

Rover) project. A heated discussion flared up suddenly on what kind of equipment it should carry. Simultaneous interpreters gave up in despair, but the scientists managed perfectly well without them. Passions ran high, and the chairman had to intervene... The discussion sounded like something out of a sci-fi novel. Incidentally, however, it wasn't about matters concerning the distant future: the Mars Rover could well set out on its journey as early as 1992.

The time of universal space euphoria is long past. Some have their misgivings about the rationale of "throwing" so much "away" into outer space. Aren't there enough problems to attend to on earth?

"To a narrow-minded 'practical man,'" **Academician Vitaly Goldansky** said, "any expenses other than those to meet his immediate needs make no sense. I suspect such a man regards even public education as not being value enough for his money. However, the record of space research shows that it returns all the investments made in it with interest. The practical spinoffs from space exploration have exceeded by far our expectations of 30 years ago."

Dr Thomas O. Paine, ex-adviser to the U.S. President on scientific matters, NASA's chief administrator at the time when the first man set foot on the surface of the Moon, was even more categorical:

"The U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Europe and Japan allocate meagre sums to space research. Let us look back 500 years when the era of great geographical discoveries began. The countries which invested much money in the exploration and development of the new lands advanced much further in the end than did the 'thriftier' countries."

Today space research is part and parcel of the industrialized countries' economies, indeed it is one of the high-technology branches which attract large investments and are of immediate practical benefit. Space television, for instance, saves hundreds of millions of rubles as compared with conventional TV networks. The COSPAS-SARSAT system has already helped rescue about a thousand people in distress. Artificial earth satellites have cut expenses on geological surveying by 15-20 per cent, and added to the efficiency of mineral prospecting. Moreover, they are of valuable help to fishermen, land reclamation experts and foresters. These are only a few of the numerous uses the satellites are put to.

Nevertheless, the spin-off from Soviet investments in space research could have been more impressive. At times we are in no hurry to use information obtained with great difficulty by, for example, an orbital station. Why so? How are we to step up the efficacy of space research?

"I pin great hopes on perestroika," **Georgy Grechko** replied. "It must be carried through in all spheres, cosmonautics included. After all, cosmonautics is as important a branch of the national economy as agriculture and engineering. One shouldn't imagine that the stagnation that once affected them passed cosmonautics by. There are still obstacles to space research, which suffers from a number of shortcomings. For fear of loss of prestige, we used to gloss over our setbacks and overemphasize our achievements. It's good that times are changing and we are getting our share of criticism. Let there be less bombastic talk and less fanfare but more action. It is only on this condition that we'll have more to show for our space effort.

Frankly, it was whispered "off-stage" that the Russian space research programme had gone awry, and that we wanted to use the international community for our own purposes. This rumour was exploded by one of the most popular round tables, Space Research and Economics. Foreign scientists and experts closed in on the head of the Soviet Glavkosmos amalgamation, sounding him out on the question of using Soviet carriers and satellites to help not only developing countries but even the United States, France and other leaders in the field along with their own space research programmes.

We asked **Guri Marchuk, President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences,** to comment on the results of the Forum.

"I consider it an outstanding event. We have not only reviewed the record of peaceful space research over the past thirty years, but also outlined the avenues for further activity."

Still, what was it that distinguished the Forum from other such events? We managed to obtain the answer to this question from the busiest man at the Forum - **Academician Roald Sagdeyev,** Director of the Space Research Institute.

"Speaking of individual sections," Academician Sagdeyev said, "they simply offered their participants another chance to get together and discuss their problems. Now, the Forum as a whole was unprecedented in that it attracted experts from a wide variety of fields, banking included. The family of scientists concerned with outer space has now grown."

"There was a lot of talk at the Forum about a flight to Mars. Is this a realistic proposition, and what will carrying out this project involve?"

"Remarkably, every expert who attended the Forum knew what could and should be done to make this flight a reality. We devoted comprehensive discussion to the problem, and to ascertain up what the flight would mean to science. The consensus was that it would pay to carry out the project despite the expense. It will be a serious alternative to the arms race."

Interviewers: EVGENY ANDRIANOV and NIKITA ZHOLKVER

I am convinced that of all human ventures space research is the most international one. Its very character and its long-term objectives are such that it cannot be conducted by any one country or organization single-handed, and calls for a concerted effort on the part of the whole of mankind, of our entire civilization. Hopefully, meetings like this will help get cooperation under way between the two leading space powers - the Soviet Union and the United States. All the more so as we've already had a fine experience of such cooperation - I mean the Soyuz-Apollo joint space mission. But it's high time that we went further, both in our cooperation and in the Universe. I think the one is unthinkable without the other. What's especially important today is that joint U.S.-Soviet space projects would show the world that our two countries, which have stockpiled enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, are capable of working together on behalf of all mankind, in the interests of mankind, in the interests of development.

On the last day of the forum we marked the 30th anniversary of the launching of the first artificial earth satellite, which ushered in the space era. That was the first artifact to leave the nest of our civilization. Our new space achievements have not overshadowed its importance and its glory. The first man in orbit, the first walk in space, the first men on the Moon, and all our future achievements are epic landmarks in the history of space research initiated by the sputnik. Already we have come to take the space Odyssey for granted, and got used to telecasts from orbit and from other planets, yet one sometimes finds it hard to believe that all this is true, and that we Russians and Americans have paved the way to the stars for the people of our planet. I am confident that if we have enough sense to prevent self-destruction, posterity will

Carl Sagan:

"My main sphere of interests is to stay alive"

At the Moscow Forum, the well-known American astrophysicist was interviewed by journalist ALEXANDER GURNOV. The American guest talked mostly about space, of course, but touched on other things besides.

always remember our time as the age of space pioneers.

However, the same rockets, the same technology, the same electronic systems and the same computers can now be used for peaceful and military purposes alike. It is well-known that many in America were really frightened by the launching of the first Soviet sputnik. It was an indication of Moscow having developed powerful rockets capable of carrying nuclear weapons. That was why the United States was so sensitive over your breakthrough into near-earth space. And that explained why the American space programme aimed at achieving something impressive, something that would show the world that we are as strong as the Russians. America succeeded in that when our Apollo crews landed on the moon.

Since then, peaceful competition and research rivalry have been parallelled by military escalation. I'd say that the Creator has let us have these high-powered space vehicles and given us advanced knowledge for the express purpose of finding out how sensible his creation is. The question now is whether we succeed in making good rather than evil use of all this, in preserving life on earth.

My main sphere of interest is survival. And to know that I leave my children and grandchildren a planet fit to live on. It is this consideration of vital importance to all that imparts tremendous importance to the understanding our two countries have reached. This is only the first step, of course. The sides have still to finalize the details of the future agreement, control measures included, and possibly to overcome certain difficulties. Moreover, the agreement will have to be ratified by legislative bodies.

Nevertheless, considerable progress has obviously been made. Although the understanding reached covers a fairly small number of warheads, it is important as a sign that our two countries - whose military confrontation is regarded by the world as a threat to its existence - can set about reducing their deadly arsenals together, that they are capable of working out an effective system of control over disarmament, that they are moving towards confidence. And it is confidence based on adequate control that is the vital factor for success in what matters most - strategic arms reduction, which, I hope, will be carried out in the near future.

There is now much talk about inertia in the escalation of the arms race. Such an inertia does exist, but it can be reversed given the appropriate impulse. Even a small step in this direction would be of inestimable importance, no matter how great an effort it took. After all, it would lead to more steps. This is what makes the understanding reached in Washington so especially important. At the same time this understanding is fraught with psychological danger. Now some people may have the impression that it's all over, that the missiles have been done away with and there is nothing to work for any longer. This is wrong! All we've done is to take the first step.

The programme for long-term cooperation in exploring Mars appears extremely interesting to me. Is this programme feasible? It is necessary to differentiate between our two countries' technological, material and psychological preparedness for this cooperation. I think that technically a flight to Mars will pose fewer problems than the Apollo programme did in its time. All the more so as Soviet space crews have already stayed in orbit for longer than it takes to reach Mars. As for expenses, such a mission will cost almost as much as just one of our strategic military systems does. So if our countries give up at least one such system in favour of this unprecedented experiment, it would benefit not only science but also the cause of peace, and be plain common sense. The most important aspect of the matter is the psychological one: are we prepared to change over from confrontation to cooperation, are we willing and able to work together? This question must be answered in the affirmative.

The day when Carl Sagan and his colleagues marked the 30th anniversary of the space age saw another anniversary - that of Professor Sagan's arrest on the U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada. It was neither the first, nor the last time the Professor has been arrested for voicing his protest at the Pentagon's policy of building up nuclear arsenals and of arms modernization, for openly backing the Soviet nuclear test moratorium together with his supporters and calling on Washington to accede to this peace action. I asked him whether he was running new risks by visiting the U.S.S.R., having his books brought out by our publishers, and making public statements in Moscow.

I am not. I am not breaking the laws of my country, and this is probably why I am now at large, despite repeated arrests. Besides, I cannot be accused of being unpatriotic because I am equally critical of my own country and yours. Unfortunately, I must say that when I have been critical of the U.S. on previous occasions, my interviews appeared in your press, but when I criticized your country they did not.

But times are changing, and I hope that your policy of perestroika and glasnost will continue to bring positive results. I shall mention just two examples of glasnost in your papers which made a great impression on me: the trials of those responsible for the Chernobyl tragedy and of the ships masters whose negligence caused the collision on the Black Sea were given full coverage by the Soviet press. Glasnost is changing the image of the Soviet Union radically in the eyes of the world, especially in those of my compatriots.

It dooms to failure the attempts being made by some Americans to presente your country as one huge prison, an empire of evil. Openness promotes cooperation and healthy competition. One of the most important aspects of glasnost is putting the nation in contact with its history, admitting past mistakes, filling in the blanks. Sufice it to mention the publication of the novel Children of Arbat by Anatoly Rybakov. Incidentally, the Americans would be well-advised to adopt your glasnost. In our own history there are many episodes we prefer to pass over in silence. And if the U.S.S.R. carries on in this direction, other countries will follow your example of openness, I am sure.

■

A visit to three countries

The official visits paid by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were the first ever such high-level visits in the history of the Soviet Union's contacts with those countries.

The history of our relations with Latin American countries goes back many decades. As early as 1828 Russia exchanged credentials with Brazil, which had proclaimed its independence six years earlier. At that time this was the equivalent of establishing diplomatic relations. On the 150th anniversary of that day, the Soviet Embassy in Brazil presented the Brazilian government with copies of the documents, which are now kept in the archives of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in the Itamarati Palace. And in the middle of the last century Russia and Brazil signed a treaty under which each country granted the other most favoured nation status.

More than a hundred years ago - on October 22, 1885 - the Russian envoy Alexander Ionin initiated diplomatic relations between Russia and Argentina.

The first contacts with Uruguay came later. But that country was the first in South America (and the second after Mexico on the American continent) to recognize the Soviet Union. That was in August 1926.

In recent years relations between our countries have had their ups and downs, their freezes and thaws. Lately, however, mutually advantageous cooperation has again been under way. Reporting many of these important events, the press has often had to use the phrase, "for the first time ever." In December 1985, for example, there was the first official visit of Olavo Egidio Setubal, the then Brazilian Foreign Minister, to the Soviet Union. In 1986, again for the first time, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dante Mario Caputo, and the Head of State, Raul Alfonsin, visited the Soviet Union. And finally, in July 1986, the first official visit to our country was paid by the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Enrique Iglesias.

Along with mutual political consultations a regular exchange of messages is taking place between the leaders of our countries on current issues in world politics.

In recent years the Brazilians, Argentinians and Uruguayans have made notable progress in eliminating the dire heritage the military juntas passed on to their constitutional governments, especially in the field of human rights. The positive changes in their internal political life have also had a favourable effect on their foreign policy, and their international prestige has been greatly enhanced.

Eduard Shevardnadze noted the constructive contribution made by the Latin American countries to curbing the arms race, and strengthening peace, cooperation and trust between nations. The three countries he visited take an active stand on disarmament. They have on many occasions put forward concrete proposals. It is enough to recall the initiative made by Brazil on a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic, as well as its proposals gradually to restrict the force of underground nuclear explosions, and proclaim Latin America a nuclear-free zone. Or Argentina's active role in the Delhi Six, where, together with Mexico, it represents the interests of the Latin American continent. It was also noted that Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay had played no little part, as active members of the Latin America Contadora Support Group, in the Guatemala agreement on the settlement of the Central American conflict.

During talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, the Latin American countries again spoke of the need for serious efforts on the part of all governments to get the cardinal problems that concern all of mankind resolved, and first and foremost, such issues as disarmament and the strengthening of peace and international security.

It was agreed that hostility and confrontation should be excluded from international relations, that the use or the threat to use force should be deemed inadmissible, and that conflict situations, including those in Central America and over the Falkland (Malvine) islands, should be resolved by peaceful means. The need to develop cooperation in the economic, ecological and humanitarian fields was noted, and it was suggested that talks to conclude an agreement providing for the total and complete banning of nuclear testing should not be postponed.

Bilateral cooperation featured prominently in the talks held by the Soviet Foreign Minister. The ministers noted that relations had grown stronger and that there was a trend towards intensifying, expanding and deepening them.

At the same time, it was recognized that these relations (and, particularly, economic ties) do not as yet fully answer to their potential. In order to rectify this situation, a number of documents was signed, providing for the further development of trade, economic, diplomatic and cultural cooperation and designed to make good the shortcomings.

Before returning home, Eduard Shevardnadze paid a working visit to Havana at the invitation of the Communist Party and government of Cuba.

ANATOLY MEDVEDENKO

UNITED NATIONS

In the military staff committee

●SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ENSURING SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

For almost three months the situation in the Persian Gulf has been anything but calm. It could be compared to a burning fuse attached to a gigantic powder barrel. The methods used by the United States and its allies to put out the fire only serve to make it burn more brightly. Nor have other methods used to ensure safety of navigation in the Gulf helped.

So what next?

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V.F. Petrovsky, speaking at a press conference at the United Nations on September 29, said the Soviet Union believes that the problem could be solved with the help of the representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Military Staff Committee. Naturally, all interested countries could take part in such talks. Under the U.N. Charter, each country is represented on the committee by its chief-of-staff. Moreover, continued V.F. Petrovsky, such meetings would help galvanise the committee and give it its proper weight. If our partners are ready to work at such a level, he concluded, we are ready too.

BRITAIN

The policy of reform

AT THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL CONFERENCE THE LABOUR PARTY REVIEWED ITS BASIC POLICIES.

A critical analysis of the situation within the party was prompted by its third successive electoral defeat. The trade unions, traditionally the main source of membership and funds, have voiced their open discontent. For instance, John Edmonds, general secretary of the General, Municipal Workers and Boilermakers, threatened to withhold the union's annual one-million pound contribution to the party unless internal bickering stops and order is restored.

Labour leader Neil Kinnock is faced with an uphill task. He has to come up with a programme that will attract new votes, especially from among the wealthier strata. According to the latest Gallup poll, 49 per cent of Britons think Labour will never regain power, and only a little over a third of the respondents said they would vote Labour. Second, many of Kinnock's associates are careful not to impinge on the interests of the numerous left faction who are already threatening "civil war" within the party if it abandons its traditional principles.

Eye-witnesses say that Kinnock faced the complex situation cheerfully and confidently. He scored his first victory when a majority at the conference voted for his new system of electing candidates for Parliament. Under the new system, electoral colleges will be created which will give rank-and-file members of the party a bigger say in electoral procedure. Not surprisingly, the new electoral system received the backing of the trade unions, as 40 per cent of the members of the electoral colleges will be trade union representatives.

Labour's defence policy is expected to be a bone of contention. On the eve of the conference news about Labour's intention to revise its anti-nuclear commitments leaked to the press. Shadow foreign secretary Gerald Kaufman said Labour could agree to the Trident programme for the duration of the Soviet-American disarmament talks. The conference's resolutions on military and political problems emphasize multilateral disarmament and offer no concrete agenda for eliminating nuclear weapons. Although the conference reiterated Labour's non-nuclear defence principles, its leaders have been less categorical on the issue and have allowed for the possibility of "adjustments" in the future. Experts believe this will lead to serious differences within the party.

"He is the man who made the Stealth bomber. Now we have to steal money for it from the taxpayers."

Cartoon by Vsevolod Arsenyev

By and large, however, Kinnock has managed to strengthen his position in the party leadership, as evidenced among other things by the results of the elections to the national executive, from which the left has emerged considerably weakened. Ahead lie difficult debates to revise other aspects of Labour policy.

YURI KUDIMOV

EGYPT

Strings attached

●THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BELIEVES IT HAS THE RIGHT TO INFLUENCE THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF DEBTOR COUNTRIES.

During the recent talks in Cairo between IMF representatives and Egypt, the possibility of rescheduling Egypt's debts was discussed. According to the Egyptian paper Al-Wafd, the sum involved is 4.5 billion dollars. Egypt is in dire financial straits. Its foreign debt, including civilian and military loans, amounts to some 40 billion dollars.

Cairo has been presented with a series of political and economic demands. One is to cut subsidies to state-owned enterprises and companies, subsidies which at present account for about a third of the national budget. In the past subsidies have enabled the government to maintain low prices for staple foods, such as grain, legumes, and vegetable oil. In addition, the creditors have demanded a rise in the profit ceiling permitted to private Egyptian and foreign concerns. To improve Egypt's balance of payments, the IMF has demanded a "cut in consumption," which would mean a rise in the prices of prime necessities.

Until recently, the country's economic situation was alleviated by currency remittances from Egyptians working in the oil emirates. Last year they remitted an impressive sum of 2.5 billion dollars to their families at home. Egypt has earned a further 2.3 billion dollars annually from oil exports. Now the explosive situation in the Persian Gulf has caused hundreds of thousands of Egyptians to return home, and the flow continues.

If Cairo gives in to its creditors, the public sector will be weakened and possibly privatized. Things will be made easier for the foreign monopolies. It looks as if Egypt has failed to appraise critically the results of Sadat's "open door" policy. During his presidency, the country's foreign debt increased more than tenfold.

A major factor contributing to Egypt's loss of economic independence is its "special relationship" with the U.S. Cairo is now the second biggest recipient of American aid after Israel. However, not a fraction of the staggering 18 billion dollars the country has received in the past decade has gone to build a single enterprise in the civilian field.

According to Caspar Weinberger, Egypt is a springboard for a leap into any part of the region. This was confirmed by the Bright Star-87 military manoeuvres involving U.S. and Egyptian troops. According to the Arab press, this was the biggest and most important exercise involving the Pentagon in the region since the second world war.

ALEXEI MAKOVSKY

CASE 50285 CLOSED

New Times wins court case in Paris

A brief cable from the eminent French lawyer Joe Nordmann in Paris read: "It gives me pleasure to inform you that you have won your case." In our issue No. 28, 1987, we gave a detailed account of an unprecedented incidient in the history of our magazine when U.S. citizen Lyndon LaRouche and the French European Working Party instituted legal proceedings against New Times. LaRouche, the guiding spirit and de facto leader of the EWP, an international anti-communist organization active in the U.S. and many West European countries, was displeased with the article in New Times (No.36, 1986) which exposed the nature of the European Working Party and the political face of LaRouche himself. New Times based its conclusions on numerous facts and statements in the world press, including the American press, which has more than once described the EWP leader as a racist and a vehement anti-Semite.

Incensed, LaRouche and his French supporters sued New Times. Simultaneously, they sued the French book dealers Globe and Maison du livre etranger, which distribute our magazine in France, and Aeroflot (the Soviet Airline) which delivers it to France. The plaintiffs claimed that we, as respondents, should pay a considerable sum in damages. The magazine decided to fight the case employing Maitre Joe Nordmann to represent its interests.

Case 50285 was heard in the Paris High Court on July 1. But we had to wait another three months as the court was to announce its decision on September 30.

Upon receiving the telegram from Joe Nordmann we called his office.

"We won the case," said Maitre Nordmann with undisguised pleasure. "We won it on all counts."

What does the verdict say?

It says that LaRouche was wrong in all his charges against you, and has to pay damages. Moreover, the court is making him pay costs.

What are the grounds for the court decision?

The expressions and words you used corresponded to the truth.

Has the decision come into force?

Not yet. LaRouche has the right to appeal within a month after being notified of the court's decision.

Is he going to appeal?

I don't know

Thank you, Maitre Nordmann.

So, the Paris High Court has pronounced its verdict on the lawsuit against New Times. We will come back to the case in future issues as we think there are important lessons to be learned from it.

Welcome signals from Murmansk

Mikhail Gorbachev's ideas are the subject of lively discussion in the region

For many years Northern Europe has been setting the world an example of military and political balance.

However, the oversaturation of the earth with nuclear and conventional weapons is being increasingly felt in that part of the continent too. Denmark and Norway which, though members of NATO, have refused to allow foreign military bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, see their stand threatened. Denmark's decision does not cover Greenland, which is part of the kingdom. It has a network of U.S. military facilities. In July, the Americans put the major radar station Pave Paws in Thule in a state of combat readiness, in violation of the ABM treaty.

U.S. naval activity is moving closer to Norway. The surface ships and submarines of the U.S. and other NATO countries constantly ply its waters, practising operations to "neutralize" the Soviet naval presence close to Soviet ports at the "initial stage" of a potential conflict.

Northern Europe is following with alarm the progress of the U.S. programme to deploy 4,000 cruise missiles on U.S. naval ships, most of which are intended for operations in the Northern seas. This concern on the part of Northerners for the peaceful future of the region is easily understood if one considers that 800 of these missiles will carry nuclear warheads and that the U.S. air force is being hastily equipped with similar weapons.

Nuclear-free zone

One of the most popular ideas in the region is collective security through the creation of a nuclear-free zone. First advanced by Finland, the proposal was shelved for a long time before the conditions for its realization became favourable. At present, practical work is under way to bring the viewpoints of the states concerned closer together. A special group of representatives of foreign ministries has been set up for the purpose. There has been a positive reaction in the North European countries to that part of Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in which he elaborated on the flexible Soviet approach to international guarantees of the status of the zone, to the withdrawal of nuclear-missile systems from adjacent Soviet territory and of submarines with ballistic missiles from the Baltic Sea, as well as the restriction on Soviet military exercises in areas close to Scandinavian borders.

President Mauno Koivisto of Finland has stated that the Finnish government is particularly appreciative of Soviet support for the proposed nuclear-free zone. Other political leaders have also drawn attention to the positive signals from Murmansk, which are in striking contrast to the negative U.S. attitude towards confirming the status of Northern Europe as a region free of nuclear weapons.

The current session of the Danish Folketing (parliament) is expected to take up the problem of committing the country to a non-nuclear policy in time of war as well as peace. The Swedish Riksdag is planning, before the end of this month, to consider closing the country's ports to all foreign naval vessels suspected of carrying nuclear weapons. This is a clear reference to visits by naval ships from U.S. and Britain.

Limiting naval activity

"The Swedish side welcomes the interest of the Soviet Union in arms control agreements and confidence measures at sea in the North European region," said Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson. Norway's Defence Minister Jörgen Holst, who has long been expressing concern over the possible escalation of tensions between the navies of the great powers in the Norwegian Sea, also welcomes the Murmansk initiative.

The U.S.S.R. is ready to start consultations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on restricting military activity and limiting the scale of naval and air force activity in the Baltic, Norwegian and Greenland seas, and on spreading confidence measures and banning naval activity in mutually agreed zones of intensive navigation and in international straits.

The disengagement of the Eastern and Western navies will help to allay both NATO's worries over the safety of carrying reinforcements by sea from the U.S. to Western Europe, and the concern of the U.S.S.R. over the presence of naval strike forces of the U.S. and its allies close to the strategically important Kola Peninsula and the densely populated Soviet Baltic coast.

Cooperation in the Arctic

All the Northern countries have high-latitude regions. Their proximity to the North Pole has traditionally been an incentive for the Northeners to explore and develop the Arctic. Today, however, financial, transportation, technological and ecological problems are preventing the comparatively small North European states from continuing active research and exploration in the Arctic. That is why the Murmansk proposals on cooperation in the development of Arctic resources, the conservation of the vulnerable northern environment, and navigation along the Northern Sea Route, have attracted such attention.

At present the Norwegians and the Swedes are prospecting for gas in Spitsbergen, and the Soviet Union is planning similar work. Its processing and transporting, however, will present a formidable problem. But if the states concerned come together, then Norway's advanced high-latitude off-shore gas extraction technology, Sweden's expertise in building specialized vessels, and the Soviet Union's colossal potential in Northern navigation, will enable this task to be solved to the benefit of all.

Pending the discovery of gas in Spitsbergen, there is the Soviet idea of an integrated power system for Northern Europe. One of the key elements of the project could be the gas pipeline from the Soviet Union. It has already reached Finland, and, as I was told at the headquarters of the Scandinavian concern Neste, it would be logical to extend the pipeline to Sweden.

The six-point programme proposed in Murmansk has come in for wide comment and discussion. Carl Bildt, leader of the Swedish Conservatives, believes that "Mikhail Gorbachev has come out with broad and important initiatives. Some of them are open-ended ideas whose aim is to stimulate debate."

ALEXANDER POLYUKHOV
our own correspondent

Stockholm

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY

LEV BEZYMENSKY

We often forget our own virtues.

What a stunning effect Soviet foreign policy had on the world in 1917 when, breaking with all tradition, it boldly opened up the safes at the tsarist Foreign Ministry and began to publish the most hidden secrets - Russia's secret treaties. Sailor Markin, who was in charge of this unprecedented operation, came to personify the new, people's diplomacy, which no longer spoke in the hushed whispers of experienced diplomats in their gold-braided suits, but in a clear, loud voice that could be heard not only by its own people, but by other peoples as well.

Ancient history, infantile diseases? That is the easiest way to shrug it off, recalling the efforts of the once-boycotted Soviet diplomacy to make a place for itself in the recognized circles of international relations, the immense role of our country, its obligations, the need to abide by the universally recognized rules (often unwritten but all the more inviolable), and saying that one did not wish to be accused of "propaganda."

Glasnost in relations between states is a tricky and even risky business. Of course, Talleyrand's dictum ("a man is given the powers of speech in order to conceal his opinions") is no longer the sole rule in diplomatic circles, but.... One has to admit that in Soviet foreign policy, too, reasons of state (in the narrow sense of the word) did at times get the upper hand over Lenin's dictum: tell the truth, tell everyone what we ourselves think, "speak out straight and openly."

Naturally, one cannot overlook "the other side." Over the past 70 years diplomacy in the capitalist world has developed to perfection the arts of secret deals, multilateral intrigues and wily machinations often woven in secret not only from the broad masses of the people, but at times also from the parliaments and governments of the countries concerned. One such pearl was the behind-the-scenes intriguing on the eve of World War II, when all the Western participants were trying to arrange a deal that would channel the aggression to the East, and became so confused that they themselves fell the victims to the aggressor. And that recent example - Irangate? These testify eloquently that when plans are directed against the people, those who hatch them and carry them out become inevitably involved in secret operations and dirty deals.

It would be dangerous to seek counterarguments along the same lines. Experience itself produces other counterarguments and countermoves. It is sufficient to scan the picture of public movements in our contemporary world to notice an entirely different trend. It lies in the **new quality** of the participation of the public in the process of shaping international relations. The transition from quantity to quality is so obvious that any diplomat, any government that ignores it is at risk. It is of course possible to ignore this transition, but the price is a high one.

Why is it that people-to-people diplomacy is on the upsurge now, at the end of the 20th century? You don't have to look far for an answer: the nuclear threat, which did not previously exist, has become an argument in favour of broad public action. For a while this public action was fairly successfully paralyzed by the famous thesis - "the hand of Moscow." That was how ruling circles in the West reacted to the first steps of the peace movement. But with the passage of time it became increasingly evident that such arguments held no water.

And the overall picture of public action became wider and more varied. Side by side with the World Peace Council, there sprang up other movements, perhaps less well-organized, but involving a much wider range of people. They sprang up at times quite unexpectedly - one might recall the upsurge of protests in the Netherlands against the neutron bomb, or the movement against missiles in West Germany and other countries. But the new quality of these movements was not confined to their having a mass character. It was also evident in the hitherto unusual social and political composition of the public forces that had emerged on the political scene to prevent nuclear war and ensure the survival of mankind. In this respect the 1987 Moscow forum was an extremely important signal the whole world could hear.

Or take the latest signal: the arrival in Moscow of the Initiative-87 group from France. Recalling the past one can't help thinking what a "hand" Moscow has if it stretches so far that 365 representatives of virtually the whole spectrum of France's political forces have come to Moscow? Joking aside, Initiative-87 is - in present-day jargon - an informal association of the public forces of a leading Western country who, in the words of the organizer of the trip, the president-delegate of the France-U.S.S.R. Association Madeleine Guilbert, believe it necessary **"to ensure through the diversification of efforts a more stable peace."**

Mikhail Gorbachev had a long and detailed conversation with the French visitors, and he was not alone in doing so. Diplomacy "over the heads of governments"? Or "propaganda?" **"We proceed from the realities,"** the Soviet leader said. **"From the fact that a new type of international relations cannot be shaped today without the participation of the public forces, the peoples themselves."**

Initiative-87 is an important and symptomatic phenomenon. And it does not stand alone. If we recall, for instance, some of the professional initiatives (space researchers are currently meeting in Moscow), then we can discern the new structure of people-to-people diplomacy - diplomacy whose traditions have their beginning in Lenin. Let those who are far removed from Lenin's teachings not be discomfited by such a comparison. Just as Mikhail Gorbachev was not discomfited when Bishop Rosier offered his best wishes on St. Michael's Day.

Incidentally, Initiative-87 and the activities of certain other informal publicly-sponsored diplomatic associations compel us to introduce a few corrections into the very concept of people-to-people diplomacy which embraces not only ordinary people and their gatherings in the home. For how can that apply to Initiative-87, which included a former prime minister and a former foreign minister? Or to the meeting in Moscow of the Bergedorf Club, with the participation of a former West German chancellor? Or the visits to Moscow of former U.S. secretaries of state? Or the Edinburgh meetings? Or the Dartmouth conferences? In other words: people-to-people diplomacy at the end of the 20th century should be defined as the public expression of the will both of rank-and-file members of the public and those who are rather more than that.

Of course, people-to-people diplomacy is not the opposite of professional diplomacy. No one would dream of underrating the role of conventional diplomacy, especially today when diplomats in Geneva will be drafting important documents, documents that the entire world is awaiting with bated breath. There can be no action "over the heads of governments" here, as it is governments which will have to sign the documents. Nevertheless, millions of "people's diplomats" are invisibly taking part in the talks, for it is for the sake of their future that the agreements are to be drafted and signed. The people will not forgive failure, but they will highly value all practical steps for a better and safer world.

A "task force" lands in Shikhany

From our special correspondent
DMITRY POGORZHELSKY

A "task force" comprising four generals, 17 senior officers, as well as experts, diplomats and journalists from 44 countries, 110 people in all, arrived near a secret military installation in the Saratov Region on October 3.

How does a Soviet Major General in charge of a once obscure secret military installation feel about so many foreigners being "thrust" upon him?

Robert Fedorovich Razuvanov found it hard to conceal his emotions. Not that he resented the "intrusion." His responsible mission was to show the participants in the Geneva Disarmament Conference standard specimens of Soviet chemical weaponry and to demonstrate methods of destroying them.

The road to the proving ground

We set out for the proving ground from Barai-Baranovka military airfield along a concrete-surfaced road - a white ribbon winding its way across a vast tract of the Volga steppeland.

To my mind, however, the road to Shikhany is a temporal rather than a geographical notion - it had its beginnings in April 1985, with January and February 1986 as milestones in our progress along it. Guided by new political thinking and glasnost, we have achieved unprecedented standards of openness, as evidenced by the trip to Shikhany.

Indeed, the U.S.S.R. had not for many years made it clear whether it had chemical weapons at all, although it did conduct bilateral talks with the United States and is party to multilateral talks in Geneva on the banning and elimination of these means of mass destruction.

May I remind the reader that the U.S.S.R. was among the first countries to sign, back in 1925, the Geneva protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The use of these weapons, I repeat, not their development and stockpiling. Since then, the Soviet Union has been working persistently for the banning and elimination of these barbarous weapons of mass annihilation under effective international control, and has come up with several bold initiatives and proposals towards that end. Unfortunately, our partners - the U.S. in particular rejected them. Chemical weapons, which have become a component of the "deterrence" equation, have been and still remain in the Soviet Army's arsenal. They have been developed and stockpiled for defence purposes only. So was it really necessary to keep silent for so long? After all, the U.S.S.R. had stopped making many kinds of chemical weapon long before the United States did. But these facts have been disclosed only today.

I don't think that our silence or our resorting to evasion and ambiguity when it came to the subject of Soviet chemical weapons added weight to Soviet initiatives in Geneva, or to our partners' trust in the U.S.S.R.

The ice was broken in April 1987, when the U.S.S.R. announced that it had stopped the production of chemical weapons and was building a plant for their destruction. On August 6, the Soviet delegation said in Geneva that, eager to have a convention signed at an early date, it would insist on making on-the-spot inspections when requested a law and denying any state the right not to abide by it. (Incidentally, the British Financial Times described these inspections as a beast which hardly any government would like to let out of its cage). On the same day of August 6, the Soviet Union invited participants and observers at the Geneva talks to a chemical weapons proving ground. Moscow made this unprecedented move with the sole purpose of making the convention to ban and destroy chemical weapons a reality as soon as possible.

That is how we found ourselves in Shikhany.

The chemical weapons on display there certainly meant much more to experts than to us journalists. And it was mostly for the experts' benefit that our officers described the weapons in detail for a good two hours, and explained the effects of the toxic agents each weapon was "stuffed" with.

Foreign guests watching the complicated process of chemical weapon destruction. Photos by Y. Nabatov and A. Pushkaryov

A demonstration

Frankly, the 19 standard specimens lined up on a dazzling white podium - hand grenades, artillery shells, rocket-assisted projectiles, aircraft bombs, tactical missile warheads, each battleship - gray and bearing marking bands - did not look all that impressive or awesome. It was some time before I realized that they disgusted me. Any weapon is meant to kill, but chemical weapons do it with deadlier efficiency than other kinds.

The convention must be signed if the world is ever to get rid of chemical weapons.

The second day of the guests' stay in Shikhany was given over to demonstrations of techniques for destroying chemical weapons.

A mobile complex was deployed under a huge awning right on the proving ground. What happened there did not seem quite real.

Men wearing silvery protective suits and black gas-masks appeared on the scene and set to work. One checked a 250-kilo bomb for leaks; another got behind the wheel of a fork-lifter truck, jacked the bomb up smartly and placed it in a special unit; and a team of three opened the bomb, collected a sample of its stuffing and put it on an ordinary office desk, between two perspex hutches each containing a live rabbit.

The bomb was encased in the unit, drilled, and emptied of its toxic agent, which was subsequently transferred to a neutralizer where the most important process - toxin decomposition - took place.

Before that one of the rabbits was injected with a syringeful of liquid extracted from the bomb and put back into its hutch at once.The poor animal twitched convulsively for a second or two, and then dropped dead. The hutch was covered with a piece of white cloth.

Although not a sight for the squeamish, the demonstration was necessary to make certain that the bomb was charged with sarin nerve gas.

Two hours later, another sample was taken - from the neutralizer this time - and "pumped" into the other rabbit without doing it any harm. The process of sarin decomposition had been completed. The warmed-up liquid which had just been a deadly toxic agent, was piped into a special tank truck, carried to a furnace a little way off, and burned down at a temperature of over a thousand degrees C. Clouds of black but virtually innocuous smoke started belching from its chimney, announcing that the world was minus one chemical bomb.

Mine has certainly been only a sketchy description of how a toxic agent is neutralized; in fact, the process is fairly complex and costly. But let us leave the particulars to the experts who followed the entire process with keen interest, finalizing formulas, doses and other essential data.

What matters most is that this process was watched, at the Soviet military proving ground, by representatives of 44 states.

What next?

Two days of reports, questions, briefings and exchanges of opinion went by. I was naturally interested in what the experts had to say.

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Sweden's representative in Geneva, is also chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the Geneva Conference:

"I'd like to compliment you on this demonstration. It has been most impressive and surpassed my boldest expectations. I'm sure all we've seen here will have a positive effect on the progress of our talks in Geneva because it has established a higher level of confidence."

"Mr Ekeus, you said last winter that you hoped to be the last chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons because the talks on signing the convention had reached the final stage..."

"This is unlikely to be the case. We have now solved the key political problems connected with signing the convention. Nevertheless, there remain several matters to attend to: technical difficulties, control over permitted activities, the interests of private companies and transnational corporations, the legal problems involved in verification, the risk of proliferation of chemical weapons. Overcoming all these barriers will take more time. But we really have reached the final stage..."

Ambassador Robert van Schaik, the head of the Netherlands delegation and a former coordinator at the talks, cannot be denied imaginative thinking.

"I would compare the trip to Shikhany with reaching the top of the precipice we've been climbing for so long. This does not mean that a plain lies ahead and the going will be easier. There are still several heights to be conquered, but unless we maintain a multilateral exchange of information we shall be groping in the dark for a long time to come..."

I was particularly interested to know the opinion of the head of the American delegation. Max Friedersdorf told me he was healthily optimistic and promised that his delegation would work for the convention.

Well, let's hope it will. However, the ambassador's words do not quite tally with the fact that just a few days before his arrival in Shikhany Washington had decided to restart the production of binary chemical weapons as from December 1, 1987. Trying to justify this decision, Mr Friedersdorf claimed that far from retarding progress towards the convention, the U.S. binary programme would even accelerate it.

The rationale behind this move is anybody's guess. Does it imply that the American administration is pessimistic about the outcome of the talks - or, perhaps, about the very possibility of banning and eliminating these barbarous weapons? Or is it meant to test the Soviet position for "stamina"? It is a shame that no sooner had some real progress been made in Geneva than new and considerable obstacles were put in its way. After all, the appearance of binary weapons will enormously complicate one of the key problems - that of control.

I asked Lieutenant General Anatoly Kuntsevich, a leading expert of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defence and Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, to comment on this decision by Congress.

"The decision challenges the talks now in progress," he said, "at a time when the Soviet Union is doing everything within its power to build confidence in Geneva and to make mankind's cherished dream come true..."

The decision goes to undermine confidence. Against this background, Ronald Reagan's recent call from the U.N. platform "for greater openness, for a freer access to information about the Soviet Union and its armed forces, policies and programmes so that our arms reduction talks should proceed in the atmosphere of greater confidence" sounds hypocritical. Is it good policy to demand confidence from your partner while making moves which compel him to call into question your sincerity and your readiness to sign the convention?

In Shikhany, the word "convention" sounded very frequently. Most people want it signed at the earliest date possible. This involves problems, we admit, but all of them, no matter how serious, lend themselves perfectly to solution, as the two days in Shikhany have proved beyond doubt.

Shikhany-Moscow

Kiel "Watergate," or the harm anonymous letters can inflict

On February 10, at about 5 p.m., when Bjoern Engholm, leader of the Social Democratic opposition in Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost land in Federal Germany, was visiting the burgomaster of a small town not far from Kiel, his police guards' attention was drawn to two young men. One of them was walking up and down the street past the burgomaster's house with a camera in his hands, and taking pictures from time to time. The other remained in the car. The police found this suspicious.

It turned out that Engholm was being watched by two private detectives hired by a certain Harry Piel, the owner of a detective agency. The police naturally reported the results of their investigations to their superiors, although Engholm himself knew nothing for a long time to come.

It was only several months later that a well-wisher from the office of the land government let the Social Democrats know that their leader was under investigation. He also said that the tax office had received an anonymous letter accusing Engholm of not paying income tax on hundreds of thousands of marks.

Elections to the Schleswig-Holstein parliament were due to take place on September 13. Public opinion polls indicated that Engholm (who was well known as a politician in Federal Germany, having held a ministerial post in Chancellor Schmidt's government) rated much higher in popularity than his rival - the minister-president of the Schleswig-Holstein government, Christian Democrat Uwe Barschel. The Christian Democrats, who for 37 years had been the ruling party, were faced with the danger of being relegated to the opposition.

The CDU stooped to the dirtiest tricks to compromise the Social Democrats. In one election booklet, Engholm was described as the mouthpiece of the East. In that same publication, it was claimed that he favoured educating children in schools in a spirit of hatred and class struggle. It was alleged that the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG) intended to repeal the laws making sexual relations with minors a punishable offence. It is natural to assume that those who put about such slander could go a step further.

The bomb exploded just a few hours before the elections - on the Saturday afternoon, September 12. The magazine Der Spiegel, which usually comes out on a Monday, released the text of an article headed Kiel "Watergate." It was immediately picked up by radio and TV news broadcasts, which quoting the magazine, reported that it was none other than Barschel who had both initiated the tailing and written the anonymous letter. The actual job had been entrusted to one of his confidential employees, Reiner Pfeiffer, who had himself admitted his involvement. In his 22-page confession he revealed the following.

In mid-January Barschel instructed him to check the Engholm's tax returns. When that was done, Barschel dictated to Pfeiffer three anonymous letters: one was addressed to the tax office, the second to the Finance Minister, and the third to Barschel himself. The letter addressed to Barschel requested to investigate Engholm's tax evasions without delay. An investigation was started immediately and took three weeks. But when it was over Barschel



The preelection bout in Kiel.
Drawing from Süddeutsche Zeitung (F.R.G.)

was compelled to concede that, regrettably, Engholm had paid all his taxes down to the last pfennig.

But by that time another operation was in full swing. Günter Kohl, the CDU's press officer in Schleswig-Holstein, told Barschel that, according to his information, Engholm was leading an immoral life. Barschel immediately instructed Pfeiffer to find "reliable informers" who could provide the necessary "proof." The Piel detective agency was chosen to do the job.

But no matter how hard the detectives tried, they could find nothing to compromise Engholm.

Barschel, however, had not given up his hopes of compromsing his rival. Five days before the elections, he phoned Pfeiffer and told him to get hold of a miniature listening device. Barschel intended to instal the bug in his own telephone. The following day the phone would be checked by security agents. And there could be no doubt that their "find" would make the front pages of all the newspapers. Suspicion would naturally fall on CDU's political opponents.

But Pfeiffer, instead of obeying instructions, wrote his "confession" and, after having it duly witnessed by a notary, took it to the Der Spiegel office.

The results of the elections for the CDU were anything but happy: they lost 6.4 per cent of their votes. The Christian Democrats could remain in office in Kiel only in a coalition with the Free Democrats, who had managed to get 4 members elected to the land parliament. The biggest parliamentary group was now the SDPG.

But it would be incorrect to ascribe the CDU's losses entirely to the revelations that appeared in the press. That same day elections were also held in Bremen, which enjoys the status of a state. There were no scandals, but the CDU's results were even worse: they lost almost 10 per cent of their vote.

One has to dig deeper for the reasons for the CDU's poor showing in the state elections: first there is the conflict with the CSU over the Pershing 1A missiles, then the disputes over political problems (where should new voters be sought: to the left or to the right of the CDU/CSU), the inability of the government to cope with mass unemployment, and many other issues.

When interrogated in the Prosecutor's Office, Pfeiffer repeated all his accusations. New details of the scandal became known. In the next issue of Der Spiegel, Pfeiffer described how at the beginning of May, on instructions from his chief, he had produced a statement that was to be released as if coming from the Green Party. The purpose of this fabricated statement, containing false information about Engholm, was to cause a rift between the Greens and the Social Democrats and thus prevent any possible coalition of the two.

It did not take the CDU long to realize that the growing scandal around the Kiel minister-president was damaging the entire party. Barschel resigned. He acknowledged his political responsibility, but continued to deny any personal involvement in the hounding of the leader of the Social Democratic opposition. Engholm, however, is convinced that the smear campaign conducted against him could hardly have been possible without Barschel's knowledge. The matter is now in the hands of a special parliamentary commission. The public still has a lot to learn about the methods the CDU resorts to in the hope of retaining power in Schleswig-Holstein.

ALEXANDER TOLPEGIN
our own correspondent
Bonn

Conspiracy against the ABM treaty

On October 3, 1972, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. exchanged instruments of ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM treaty). Today Washington is misinterpreting the provisions of this accord.

VICTOR STARODUBOV

At the start of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT-1) in 1969 the Soviet Union and the United States saw eye to eye at least on one thing: substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms could not be achieved without a strict limitation of strategic defence systems. This stemmed from the objective interrelationship between defensive and offensive weapons.

That is why as a result of the SALT-1 talks completed in May 1972, the sides worked out and simultaneously signed the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty imposed strict limitations on ABM systems and the agreement on strategic ballistic missiles (ICBM and SLBM).

The ABM treaty has actually laid the legal foundation for the whole system of limitation and reduction in strategic arms. Once and for all (the treaty of unlimited duration) the sides undertook not to deploy ABM systems for defence of the territory of their countries and not to provide a base for such a defence and to limit the allowed ABM systems by the agreed minimum. These are, indeed, well-balanced and far-reaching restrictions.

For a long time the ABM treaty was a subject of special concern of both sides. To facilitate the purposes of the accord, they set up the Soviet-American standing consultative commission which regularly discussed problems arising in the process of activity of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. with regard to anti-missile defence. Twice (in 1977 and 1982) the commission considered the effectiveness of the treaty, and twice it officially confirmed the adherence of the parties concerned to its objectives.

The ABM treaty has lost none of its relevance today. Moreover, as Moscow and Washington discuss far-reaching measures to reduce strategic offensive arms, stronger confidence is needed in the stability of the basis for a new accord. There must be a guarantee that neither side will try to change in its favour the strategic balance, achieved as a result of the agreed reductions by deploying a large-scale ABM system.

Behind the smokescreen of interpretations

But the American side has gone back on its own word. The White House and the Pentagon do not conceal now that they give priority to the SDI programme rather than the ABM limitation. The aims of the SDI programme directly contradict the objectives set by the ABM treaty. The treaty cramps the work envisaged by the SDI programme. Therefore, the U.S. administration is seeking a way out of the present situation either by giving up the agreed interpretation of the basic provisions of the treaty (insisting on their "broad" interpretation) or by formally renouncing the treaty.

At the nuclear and space arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, Washington is seeking to get permission to start deploying "the most advanced" large-scale ABM system with space-based elements after 1994. This means that towards the end of 1994 such a system will have been developed, tested, manufactured and ready for deployment. And this should be ensured, Washington believes, by the changeover to a "broad" interpretation.

In real terms, this "changeover" means already today renunciation of the basic provisions of the treaty - the commitment not to provide a base for a countrywide anti-missile defence (Article 1) and the commitment not to develop, test or deploy mobile land-based or space-based ABM systems or components (Article 5).

What would be left of the treaty if such an interpretation were accepted?

The treaty would be practically cancelled out because, according to the Pentagon's estimates, the first echelon of a large-scale ABM system could not be deployed until 1994 even in the absence of the treaty. Therefore, whether the ABM treaty with its "broad" interpretation existed or not, the result would be the same: work would be conducted in accordance with the Pentagon's plans and abilities. That is why statements by U.S. administration officials about their "constructive" approach and readiness to keep within the limits of the ABM treaty till 1994, provided its "broad" interpretation is accepted, arouse considerable doubts.

The American "readiness" is counterposed by the Soviet proposal for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms provided the sides do not withdraw from the treaty for at least ten years, which in itself is a compromise since we want the term of the treaty to remain unlimited. It is also necessary scrupulously to fulfil all its provisions in the way they have been agreed on and understood by the sides until now.

The White House is aware of the negative consequences for itself if the U.S. adopts a "broad" interpretation of the treaty or directly renounces it. Washington understands that it would be much better to present this renunciation as a forced reaction to some moves of the Soviet Union. The main point in the charges the Americans bring against the Soviet Union is the "illegal" building of a radar near Krasnoyarsk.

But the Pentagon raised the question of the ABM treaty long before the "Krasnoyarsk radar" appeared. U.S. Defence Secretary Weinberger said early in 1981 (and that was not his first statement on this question) that **with a view to improving the strategic capabilities of the U.S.A.** the Reagan administration would consider a return to building up anti-missile defence. Moreover, the Pentagon had taken some steps in this direction.

As far back as 1978 the Soviet Union raised the question of the new large Pave Paws radars with phased-array antennas possessing ABM characteristic that the

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Lieutenant General Victor Starodubov took part in the SALT-1 talks (ABM treaty and Interim Agreement), in the SALT-2 talks, and in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Between 1978 and 1986 he was the Soviet representative on the Soviet-American standing consultative commission.



Drawing by I. Smirnov

Americans were deploying at the Otis base in Massachusetts and the Beale base in California. The siting of these radars and of similar radars at the Robins base in Georgia and the Goodfellow base in Texas was interpreted by the Soviet Union as an intention to provide a base for a countrywide anti-missile defence banned by Article 1 of the ABM treaty. These suspicions increased with the adoption of the SDI programme. The U.S. testing of the multiple warhead anti-missile missile also caused alarm.

Furthermore, in March 1983, long before inquiring the Soviet Union about the Krasnoyarsk radar, Washington announced its "star wars" programme aimed at the renunciation of the ABM treaty. And finally, long before the Krasnoyarsk radar was built, the Americans commissioned a radar in the area of Thule in Greenland. This radar was deployed in violation of Article 6 of the ABM treaty and the agreed statement (F) regulating the installation of large phased-array radars. In violation of the above provisions the United States is building a radar near Fylingdales Moor in Britain.

Thus the Krasnoyarsk radar is a smokescreen behind which the U.S. administration would like to cover up its own unseemly activity in the field of anti-missile defence.

The Krasnoyarsk riddle

To put an end to all the talk about the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviet government allowed U.S. representatives of authority to visit the project. On September 5 a delegation of U.S. Congressmen came to the station. They saw with their own eyes what the Soviet side had kept stating, i.e., the project was a long way from being completed. This alone should be enough for Washington to drop its charges that the U.S.S.R. is violating Article 6 or some other provisions of the ABM treaty.

The Congressmen noted that already today the station differs by some characteristics from an ABM radar or from a missile-attack warning radar system. It is not provided either with a mechanical and electronic protection system or with an autonomous power supply source. The radar is situated in the inner part of the country. The Congressmen also said that at the present stage of construction it is impossible to determine its purpose beyond all doubt. The obvious thing is that it is not an ABM radar and currently does not violate the ABM treaty.

The issue would seem to have been cleared up. At least a few years will be needed to complete the Krasnoyarsk project. Only when the radar is fitted out with equipment showing its true purpose can the Americans see whether it is a station for outer space monitoring or for something else. As for now, in my opinion, they should not ignore the explanations given by the Soviet side.

The American charges are primarily based on the following reasoning. The radar, located near Krasnoyarsk and oriented on the northeast, will not be sufficiently effective to monitor outer space because the majority of space orbits lie to the south of it. Hence they conclude that the Russians are most likely building a radar to warn against a missile attack "from the poorly protected northeast direction." This is also borne out, they say, by the external likeness between the Krasnoyarsk station and the radars deployed for the same purposes in other regions of the U.S.S.R. And if it is a warning radar then, in accordance with Article 6 of the treaty, it must be sited "along the periphery" of the Soviet territory and "oriented outward."

Answering these remarks, we patiently explained to the Americans that the Krasnoyarsk radar is intended for monitoring outer space. It is this factor that determined its location and orientation. That the majority of space orbits lie to the south of it is not a decisive factor since the minority of space orbits also need to be monitored. Besides, we should make a long-term planning.The external likeness of the Krasnoyarsk radar with the existing missile-attack warning radars in the U.S.S.R. is natural since standard designs are used in construction.

What will be the purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar then?

It will be responsible for carrying out the Soviet space programmes. However, it will monitor any space vehicles within its range of vision, and, in particular, help build up orbits for those spacecraft whose initial loops pass over the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. This also goes for space vehicles launched from the Vandenberg range with an orbital inclination of approximately 100 degrees.

The radar under construction will also check the observance of agreements on the use of outer space (it could, naturally, check the implementation of SDI-related projects), evaluate space conditions for ensuring manned space flights, and carry out some other tasks that do not run counter to the ABM treaty.

At the same time the Krasnoyarsk radar is not designed for use as a missile-attack warning facility. This is confirmed first by its location and orientation. The radar is situated thousands of miles away from the border in the direction of its operation, which cannot be described as an optimal technical solution for a radar warning system. Second, this is borne out by some design characteristics which will doubtlessly lend themselves to observation when the project is completed and the radar begins to operate.

To remove the pretexts which the opponents of arms limitation could use to undermine the SALT processes, the Soviet Union has taken an unprecedented step. Though the Krasnoyarsk radar is being built in strict accordance with the ABM treaty (which does not ban radars for outer space monitoring), Moscow has proposed to settle the question concerning it as well as the Thule and the Fylingdales Moor radars on a mutually acceptable basis.

The Soviet Union has also advanced concrete proposals for maintaining and strengthening the ABM treaty regime, including proposals for examining reciprocal complaints in this connection. At the recent talks between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington, the Soviet side suggested a meeting between the defence ministers of the two countries to discuss all charges and find a mutually acceptable solution. The U.S.S.R. stands for the maintenance and strengthening of the ABM treaty and would like the United States to display the same desire. ■

A difficult but steady ascent

CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ,
Member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of Cuba, Vice-President of the Council of State and of Ministers

Our attention was attracted by the article "An uphill task" in the 33rd issue of New Times this year. In the section Taking Up a Point, New Times staff writer Vladislav Chirkov comments on the problems of the Cuban economy. The question he discussed had been raised in a letter from Sergio Martinez, a Colombian from Medellin, who pointed out that Cuba has been a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for fifteen years, and that it is one of CMEA's objectives to raise Cuba's level of economic development to that of the European socialist countries, adding: "In view of the serious economic difficulties that are now besetting (Cuba), they (the CMEA members) have not, as I inderstand it, been successful in doing so."

Vladislav Chirkov could have replied by giving a complete picture of the Cuban economy's development over 27 years of socialism. Both praise and criticism would have been in place, but, in any case, the presentation of the subject should have been balanced and logical.

But Vladislav Chirkov clearly chose a different approach, giving particular prominence to those negative aspects of the Cuban economy which have for us become a daily target of criticism. And the author consistently fails to make the best use of this criticism in his article.

At the beginning of his article Chirkov writes that the task of measuring up to the levels of development of the CMEA countries is "challenging and complex" for Cuba. It is easy to agree with this. It is impossible to eradicate the consequences of centuries of colonialism and neocolonialism in a mere fifteen years. On the other hand, despite their comparative similarity, one cannot regard the levels of development of the European CMEA countries as identical. Perceptible differences still exist between them.

The beginning of the article seems promising, but then Chirkov succumbs to the temptation to repeat generalities made by American "cubanologists" about Cuba's inability to achieve economic successes. The author mentions Cuba's outstanding achievements in various fields - public health, education and sport - and writes that even the American industrialist Edward Lamb was compelled to admit that Cuba has achieved the highest living standard in Latin America. But this ends the list of successes and begins, unfortunately, the list of negative features which effectively take up the rest of the article. Chirkov opens with the contention that, despite the country's beneficial tropical climate, some foodstuffs are rationed. He seems to forget that in the opinion of specialists the world over tropical agriculture is particularly difficult to develop. But this is not the main point. Chirkov seems to have only second-hand information about the Cuban economy. Such shortsightedness would have been quite simply unforgivable in someone who had been to Cuba. For, when speaking about the rationing of meat, rice, milk, sugar and some other foodstuffs (incidentally, the list of rationed foodstuffs is constantly being reduced) as well as restrictions on the supply of certain consumer goods, he could have mentioned that this same system of distribution has ensured the Cuban population basic foodstuffs throughout this time,sparing the consumer from the consequences of price fluctuations and correspondingly from the consequences of differences in purchasing power. This system has guaranteed the country's entire population equal access to staple, most essential foodstuffs, while the rest can be purchased on other markets for prices which are regulated to a certain extent by supply and demand. And herein lies the essence of the rationing system.

But Chirkov goes still further. When explaining the energy situation in Cuba, he finds nothing better to say than that of the 1,368 agricultural cooperatives, 279 do not have electricity.

Let us be specific. State farms account for more than 70 per cent of the Cuban economy's agricultural sector, while agricultural cooperatives account for only ten per cent of the land and about 10 per cent of field and livestock produce. The state farms have power supplies. Had Chirkov turned to sources beyond the confines of his superficial reading, he could also have informed Mr Martinez that all these 279 cooperatives (incidentally, local power stations are being built for them) are located in the most remote mountainous parts of the country. But the most important thing is that Cuba's power supply system should not be described in the way it was. When characterising it, it should be noted that 85 per cent of the Cuban population, in both town and countryside, are supplied with electricity and that by the year 1990 this figure will have grown to 90 per cent. It is easier to visualise the scale of the changes wrought in Cuba by the revolution if we take into account that the installed power-generation capacities increased from 397,000 kilowatts in 1959 to 2,686,000 in 1986. Of course, if this had been the author's aim, he would have found a multitude of facts testifying to Cuba's economic progress.

For instance, statistics show that the deadweight of the Cuban merchant fleet grew from 72,600 tons in 1960 to 1,334,800 in 1986. The aggregate length of highways has trebled as compared with 1959. And although, as Chirkov points out, we consider the volume of housing construction to be insufficient, more than 700,000 apartments were built between 1960 and 1986. Water resources in reservoirs for farming and supplying the population have grown 200-fold: from 29 million cubic metres in 1959 to more than 6 billion in recent years. The output of cement grew from 700,000 tons in 1959 to 3,305,000 tons in 1986: installed capacities amount to 5.8 million tons. In the textile industry these capacities have grown from 81.9 million square metres in 1960 to the present 344 million square metres. As for the sugar industry, Cuba has started manufacturing 60 per cent of the equipment for its sugar refineries. It has built seven refineries and is building two more. We have also built a sugar refinery in Nicaragua. Though not yet strong enough, our machine-building industry has nevertheless increased its output from 29 million to almost 800 million pesos. The fishing industry has increased catches from under 22,000 tons in 1958 to more than 200,000 tons at present while the production of citrus fruits has grown from 85,000 tons in 1959 to 800,000 tons in 1987, of which 468,000 tons are exported.

Does this not show that we have worked not only in the field of public health, where we have built 22 hospitals with more than 400 beds each, 53 hospitals with under 400 beds, and trained 27,500 doctors; nor only in the field of education, where we have built 575 secondary boarding schools for 600 pupils each. The number of secondary school pupils exceeds a million, while the number of students at establishments of higher learning is approaching 300,000.

By listing facts like the above, Vladislav Chirkov would not only have explained to the reader in Medellin, as he does in his article, that in Latin America you will not find a single country which does not encounter difficulties, but would also have compared Cuba's progressive development with the stagnation in Latin America.

In order to help Mr Martinez appreciate the advantages of socialism for Cuba, the author could have said that at a time when hundreds of millions of people in Latin America live in the most appalling poverty and millions of children do not survive into

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use of hunger and disease, no poverty, nobody goes everyone has the neces- othing to look presentable mortality rate of 13.8 per s Cuba to rank with the d countries in the world. ner things Mr Chirkov the case. Labour producti- indeed still low. This is a situation must be recti- e trying to do this; but it ng to judge socialism's nfining ourselves to stating nost developed socialist productivity in industry is uch countries as Sweden, tes, the F.R.G. or Japan. ıy other instances, Lenin's h up and overtake!" is still although Lenin said that only be able to defeat surpassing it in labour ere are also other indica- tem's superiority over the

it seems to us that, Cuban economy, Chirkov tunate choice of several made by Comrade Fidel er leaders of our country and necessary process of nistakes. When openly and ing this struggle, we were were giving thereby our ıance to use these argu- rom the rooftop for all the ır about the so-called socialism." But it never hat they could be used in New Times as part of an superficial and negative detriment of objectivity. v Chirkov, we can assure der Sergio Martinez that s in bringing its level of to line with the constantly ne other socialist countries we can add that it is also note its two main compo- is the efforts of the Cuban leaders, and the second, cooperation of the socialist cooperation is very impor- our opinion, it is decisive. eal with its shortcomings was drawn to them, as far Union is concerned, at the conference of Soviet ic agencies mentioned by hich these shortcomings and decisions to overcome his connection, it would be t this point to use this just pretext for hushing up or own shortcomings by stance, that while the plan nd construction work in 88 per cent fulfilled, this was partly due to delayed deliveries from abroad. It would be wrong to resort to such methods. It is important to bear in mind, as Fidel Castro has repeatedly pointed out, that without cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries Cuba's economic development would either have been impossible or have been effected at an incomparably slower rate.

There was no need to emphasize then, that "the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries buy Cuban sugar, nickel and citrus fruits at much higher prices than those offered on the world market." This should have been treated from another point of view. It is wrong, for instance, to compare the prices for which Cuban sugar is bought with the prices existing on the so-called world market, as the "cubanologists" and some specialists from socialist countries are doing. One should not forget that the European Economic Community and the United States pay for their sugar imports not 5 or 6 cents (the current prices on the so-called world market), but about 20 cents per pound. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to stress the fact, pointed out more than once by Comrade Fidel Castro, that by paying these preferential prices the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are implementing in respect of Cuba the principles of the new international economic order, something that underdeveloped and developing countries have been pressing for in vain from developed capitalist countries since 1974. This alone already points to the different nature of socialism, and its superiority.

And finally a few words about Cuba's defence spending.

Chirkov confines himself to remarking that this spending is very high - "in view of the smallness of the population" and that it has grown still further since... the formation of territorial people's militia. He imparts a rather different meaning to this statement by adding that "there may be different views" as to whether the United States intends to attack Cuba or not, and concludes this sentence with the words, the Cubans "prefer to have a strong defence."

We could have said that not only Cubans, that is, the entire Cuban people, unanimously subscribe to this point of view, but that the specialists from the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries who have helped us in our efforts with the necessary armaments would seem to think similarly.

As chairman of the Cuban side in the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission, I have found it necessary to add these specifications to the information supplied to Mr Martinez by New Times staff writer Vladislav Chirkov.

Havana

SUGGESTIONS

The quicker, the better

We read the article "Borrowing from a computer" in New Times (No. 19, 1987). We found the idea expounded in it very attractive and timely. The intoduction of plastic ("electonic") money to our socialist economy presupposes strict financial accounting, and not only in the sphere of trade. As we see it, the system would make possible entirely new economic relations in the sphere of production as well. In other words, it would mean a major qualitative shift in the entire economy. If the computer system for the various payments is highly centralized, it will be possible to arrange financial relations at ministerial and departmental levels. And with time that would enable us to get rid of the vast bookkeeping system and control all the resources of an enterprise. We have sufficient specialists, and the standard of our computer techniques makes it possible to introduce such a system on a very wide scale. The quicker we start doing so, the better it will be for us.

I. SILKIN and V. LAPIN

Tambov, U.S.S.R.

OPINIONS

Foreign tourists with tents

I should like to touch on a question of great concern to me. I have already had the opportunity to see something of your country during a tourist trip organized by the G.D.R. Reisebüro. I enjoyed the trip very much. Nevertheless, I should like to point out one drawback to such tourist trips. We travelled with a group with a prearranged itinerary. We have no intention of questioning the right to existence of organized tourism, nor its popularity. Moreover, we should like to thank Intourist for its efforts to expand it.But one question arises: why is so little attention paid in the U.S.S.R. to individual tourism? Many tourists in the G.D.R. enjoy moving around the country with a tent, seeing towns, hills and forests, meeting people - an active holiday without a predetermined route and a set programme. For a foreigner this type of tourism is practically impossible in the U.S.S.R. Why? Are there any plans to change this state of affairs? All that has to be done for this purpose is to expand the network of camping sites (and this is already being done) and to follow the example of other European countries and change the rules for entry into the Soviet Union. I feel certain that this would help greatly to improve mutual understanding between peoples, foster sincerity and overcome prejudice about the U.S.S.R.

JENS BAIER

Rückmarsdorf, G.D.R.

Why in 1939?

Reflections on the origins of the second world war

VALENTIN FALIN

What was happening at this time at the Soviet-British-French negotiations? It will be remembered that London had detailed information about the nazi plans to attack Poland, and from Theodor Kordt, the counsellor of the German embassy in London, the British also knew of Hitler's view - that the success of the trilateral talks would compel Germany to refrain from war in the foreseeable future. Britain, we repeat, like the Americans, was fully informed of Germany's moves designed to prevent the U.S.S.R. from rendering Poland unilateral assistance such as the Soviet side had offered Czechoslovakia at one time. Nevertheless, Admiral Drax was given no instructions to enter into talks with the Soviet representatives on the substance of the matter. On August 17, the British asked for an interval in the talks. On August 21, the delegations met for the last time. The Soviet side made the resumption of the talks conditional on receiving definite answers from London and Paris on the issues under discussion.

Before the pact

The shortsighted, risky and irresponsible attitude of the British government in its contacts with us was due to its reluctance to create the slightest obstacle to a deal with Hitler. Its conservative mentality balked at the thought of Europe's being beholden to Moscow for the preservation of peace. The American historian Frederick Schuman was to write later that all the Western powers "preferred the destruction of Poland to Soviet defence of Poland. All hoped that the sequel (the seizure of Poland by the Reich - **V.F.**) would be a German-Soviet war."

"All" included the United States. U.S. ambassadors were quite outspoken on this score and official Washington did not contradict them. The U.S. Ambassador in London Joseph Kennedy advocated leaving the Poles to their fate, thereby compelling them to "make a deal with Hitler which would then enable the nazis to pursue their objectives in the East." Hugh Wilson, U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, shared this view. The best way out, in his opinion, was for Germany to attack the U.S.S.R. with the tacit consent of the Western powers, or with their approval.

This was the situation in which on the night of August 21 the Soviet side agreed to a visit by Ribbentrop. The brief reply by Stalin to a message from Hitler expressed readiness to enter into negotiations with the aim of concluding a non-aggression pact. Ten days later Vyacheslav Molotov announced at a session of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet that, convinced of the impossibility of reaching agreement with Britain and France, the Soviet government was obliged to seek other ways of avoiding war with Germany.

The Soviet Union held out until the very last moment, making its reaction to Berlin's soundings and persuasion dependent on whether the trend in its relations with the U.S., Britain and France was positive or negative. It waited as long as it possibly could in the hope that common sense would finally prevail in Washington, London and Paris. But Soviet interests and security meant nothing for the West. Their knowledge of Hitler's intentions backfired both for the British and for the Americans; they outwitted themselves, although to this day they blame others for their self-deception.

In the negotiations with Ribbentrop the Soviet leaders firmly insisted on the aggressive designs of Japan and Italy being checked, on recognition of Soviet interests in the Baltic and in southeastern and other parts of Europe, and on the renunciation by Germany of the "Greater Ukraine" and other such plans. The Germans met all these demands and this opened the way to the conclusion of an agreement. The non-aggression commitment went into force at once, but the agreement itself was subject to ratification. The result was a rather ambiguous situation which was compounded of many diverse factors.

There were Germany's long-range plans which had to be shelved for the sake of "normalization" of relations with us, postponed with far-reaching - immediate and more remote - consequences for the Reich's relations with Japan and Italy, and for the entire course of the world war. Then there were Britain's plans in which France, and to some extent also the United States, were involved: in August they boiled down to the partition of Poland, the severence from it of territories which prior to 1914 had belonged to Germany and Austro-Hungary, with possible compensation at the expense of Lithuania. And for the future, if nazi expansion continued eastward and a war broke out against the U.S.S.R., a still more far-reaching "redistribution of territory," this time at our expense, was envisaged. At that point the concepts of Germany and the "democracies" differed mainly as regards methods of carrying them into effect. London and Washington did not want any bloodshed in the solution of the Polish problem. Poland, like Czechoslovakia, was to pass through a phase of semi-collapse or suicide "voluntarily."

Special mention should be made of the fact that the non-aggression pact of August 23 in no way hastened Germany's attack on Poland, the date which had been set by Hitler as far back as April 3, 1939. For the nazis, the Soviet-German pact was only a manoeuvre in the implementation of their "new order" strategy. Moscow had no illusions whatever on this score. But, denied the possibility of cooperating with anyone, the U.S.S.R. was compelled, in a situation extremely unfavourable for it, to look for some way of outwitting its overt and covert adversaries. Had there been no pact it is possible, and indeed likely, that the German axe would have fallen on Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania. To halt the aggressors without a collective front was impossible and the creation of that front was sabotaged by the "democracies."

Concluded. For earlier instalments see issues Nos. 38, 39 and 40.

By safeguarding its vital interests and affixing its signature for their sake to the non-aggression pact with Germany, the U.S.S.R. did not burn its bridges to cooperation with the Western powers. On August 23 the German embassy in Moscow received the following message from Berlin: "The authoritative Soviet Russian circles asserted in the first half of the day on Tuesday (August 22) that Herr Ribbentrop's arrival for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is in no way incompatible with the continuation of talks between the British, French and Russian military delegations with the aim of organizing aggression." On the same day Molotov told French Ambassador Paul-Emile Naggiar that "a non-aggression agreement with Germany was not inconsistent with a mutual defensive alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union." On August 24, the British Foreign Office informed its embassy in Washington of Molotov's statement to the effect that after a while, say, a week, negotiations with France and Britain might be continued. Neither Paris nor Britain responded to this proposal. They were too busy pleading with Hitler.

On August 23, Nevile Henderson conveyed to Hitler Chamberlain's plea "not to commit the irreparable." On August 25, the nazi leader summoned the British ambassador in order to "make a last attempt." "I am ready," he said, "to make Britain an unparalleled proposal," namely to enter into alliance with Berlin on the following terms: a) the return to Germany of Danzig and the Polish Corridor; b) guarantee by Germany of the Polish new frontiers; c) an agreement on the German colonies; d) no changes in Germany's Western frontiers, and e) limitation of armaments. In its turn, the Reich would undertake to protect the British Empire from any possible threat.

This was said in all seriousness. But as it happened, at the very time when Hitler was talking with Henderson, a Polish-British treaty of alliance was being signed in London. The Fuehrer felt deceived and insulted, and he ordered the immediate implementation of Operation White. This meant that war would begin at dawn on August 26. And it would have had there not been a frantic telegram from Mussolini informing Hitler that Italy was not ready for war.

The Soviet historian Vilnis Sipols cites data on steps taken by the U.S.S.R. in support of the victim of aggression after the nazi attack on Poland. On September 2 (i.e., before Britain and France declared war on Germany) the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw Nikolai Sharonov visited Foreign Minister Jozef Beck and, referring to an interview with Kliment Voroshilov in which he spoke of the possibility of the Soviet Union supplying war materials to Poland, asked why Poland had not applied to the Soviet Union for help. The Polish Ambassador in Moscow W. Grzybowski was instructed to contact the Soviet side on this question only a week later, by which time Poland was already in its death agony.

September 1939

The Soviet decision to send Red Army units into the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia was not an easy one to take. The Germans had raised this question on September 3, and on September 5 Moscow had replied in the negative. On September 8 Ribbentrop, referring to the fact that the Poles had ceased organized resistance, raised the question again. On September 10, Molotov told Schulenburg that the Soviet troops, if and when sent in, would be activated for political and not military reasons, pointing out that "Poland is disintegrating, in view of which the U.S.S.R. must come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians who are threatened by the Germans." On September 15, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to register Berlin's objections to the "anti-German spirit of the justification given for the action."

On September 12, Wilhelm Keitel held a conference at which various models of the "final solution" of the Polish problem were examined. Variant III provided for a) Lithuania being offered the Vilna area, and b) Galicia and Polish Ukraine becoming independent. Under this variant intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr) chief Wilhelm Canaris was ordered to foment rebellion in the Ukrainian areas, and "provoke the rebels to massacre the Jews and Poles." It was proposed in these areas to give effect to what SS Gruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich was to report to his superiors on September 27:

"In the areas we have occupied all but 3 per cent of the Polish elite has been exterminated." The order for the uprising using the nationalist bands led by Melnik was rescinded only after the Red Army units had entered Western Ukraine.

By the time the Soviet armed forces entered Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia on September 17, the Polish state institutions had ceased to show any sign of life, and agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland had thus been terminated. Poland had become a convenient field for all kinds of chance and unexpected developments fraught with danger for the U.S.S.R. Therefore, the Soviet government which had been **neutral until then** could no longer remain indifferent to these facts. It felt itself obligated to come to the aid of its Ukrainian and Byelorussian brothers so as to ensure them the conditions for a peaceful life. The limits of the advance of the Soviet forces westwards coincided basically with the Curzon line which the Western powers had at one time designated as the eastern frontiers of Poland.

It will be recalled that on September 6 the Polish government moved from Warsaw to Lublin, and thence on September 9 to Kremenets, on September 13 to Zaleshchiki on the Romanian border, and from there abroad on September 16. On September 19, the Wehrmacht's Polish campaign ended, although Warsaw held out until September 28, the Modlin fortress until September 30, and the defenders of Hel port, until October 2.

Another significant circumstance. It was not until **September 24** that the **exchange of the instruments of ratification** after which the Soviet-German non-aggression pact entered fully into force took place in Berlin. This, too, was not just a formality. Caution prompted the U.S.S.R. not to give the imperialist powers any excuse for provocation. The agreement came fully into force when post-Versailles Poland had ceased to exist and when Europe had been plunged into the abyss of a new war.

The declaration by Britain and France of war on Germany on September 3 and their practical actions were two entirely different things. The demonstrative unwillingness of the French and British to organize a real second front in the West in these conditions, on the one hand, confirmed the worst suspicions that could not but arise in Moscow in the context of the trilateral negotiations, and, on the other hand, could be and indeed were interpreted by the nazis as an invitation to make another deal.

On September 2, 1939, Sir Horace Wilson informed the German diplomats that Germany could get what it wanted if it ended hostilities. The British government was ready to forget everything and begin negotiations, Chamberlain's adviser emphasized. That London hoped to be able to keep the conflict within definite bounds was evident from its intention to agree the rules of warfare with Germany, especially at sea and in the air.

Hitler's directive No. 2 of September 3, 1939, on the conduct of hostilities had much in common with the British approach. Among other things it stipulated that the movement of substantial forces from east to west could only be done with the personal permission of the Fuehrer. Unlimited submarine warfare was forbidden. Air attack on the British naval vessels in harbours or at sea, and also military transports, were permitted only in "special circumstances." Hitler reserved to himself the right to decide about raids on Britain proper and also on the bombing of

merchant ships. A similarly strict regime was introduced with regard to France. Here only retaliatory measures, moreover such as would not provoke enemy counteraction, were permitted. Later German flyers were forbidden to carry out random bombings during raids on Britain. The restrictions were lifted only after several massive British air raids on German towns.

According to Walter Schellenberg, head of the SS foreign intelligence, at the end of 1939 Hitler voiced his regrets over the fact that "we have to wage a life and death struggle within one and the same race, while the East is only waiting for Europe to bleed itself white. Therefore I will not and must not destroy England. Let it remain a sea and colonial power, but on the continent we must merge in a single whole. Then we shall dominate Europe and the East will no longer be a menace. That is my goal."

The course of events held out no other reasonable alternative to the Western "democracies" and the Soviet Union but the need to leave aside minor issues and concentrate on the main objective - joint struggle against the nazi aggression. Subsequent developments furnished stern proof of this conclusion. Security was indivisible as long ago as the 1930s - not in words, but in reality. But experience was acquired in the process of grave mistakes. Politicians still tried to gain an advantage to the detriment of others, and often preferred the latter to gaining a mutual benefit.

What was gained by the pact?

What was the positive effect of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on Soviet security and the strategic situation in the world as a whole?

First. It frustrated the plans for unleashing war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany in 1939, with Britain, France and the United States left rejoicing in the sidelines. Rejoicing and waiting for an opportune moment to intervene and dictate their own terms of a settlement. Their attitude to the belligerents would not of course have been the same for both sides. As like as not it would have been similar to that of the "democracies" during the Spanish civil war, the only difference being that the German-Soviet confrontation was to exhaust both sides. In the case of Russia, to the point where the structure of Soviet power and the state itself would collapse. By foiling the schemes of imperialist reaction, the U.S.S.R. gained time vitally needed to prepare to repulse the aggression threatening it.

Second. In the opinion of some German generals and politicians, the conclusion of the pact of August 23, while giving Germany short-lived tactical advantage, dealt it irreparable strategic damage. In a memorandum dated November 20, 1939, Lieutenant General Ludwig Beck, former chief of the General Staff, wrote that the success of the war against Poland had been devalued by the advance of the U.S.S.R. westward. The Soviet Union, he said, was not doing Germany's bidding but was pursuing its own advantage. Field Marshal von Witzleben held that in general "the rapprochement with Russia was a mistake." The Liedig memorandum submitted to the Wehrmacht supreme command in December 1939 actually spoke of "betrayal." "Germany could well reach agreement with Britain and save Europe from the number one enemy - Soviet Russia, but Hitler is doing quite the contrary. Meanwhile, Russia is monstrously expanding," the author wrote.

The August 23 pact gave the U.S.S.R. a chance to attend to what in present-day terminology is called "forward defences." In the autumn of 1939 the Soviet Union concluded with Estonia (September 28), with Latvia (October 5) and with Lithuania (October 10) agreements on mutual assistance and the commitment not to enter into compacts directed against the partner. Under the agreements the U.S.S.R. acquired bases on the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, in the Baltic ports of Liepaja and Ventspils, artillery positions in the Gulf of Riga, and also airfields in Lithuania and Estonia. All this, as well as the safeguarding of the security of Leningrad, was in the order of things at that time.

These then were preventive measures. Were they unusual? How did they compare with what, say, the British were doing? In September 1939 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, recommended ignoring the neutral status of the Scandinavian countries and drawing them de facto into the British military operations. In a memorandum dated December 16 the same year, Churchill proposed **occupying Norway and Sweden** in order to "meet the German invaders on Scandinavian soil," in particular by occupying Narvik and Bergen irrespective of whatever retaliatory action Germany might take. "No technical infringement of international law, so long as it is unaccompanied by inhumanity of any kind," the memorandum said, "can deprive us of the good wishes of neutral countries. No evil effect will be produced upon the greatest of all neutrals, the United States. We have reason to believe that they will handle the matter in the way most calculated to help us. And they are very resourceful.



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WAR
C

1939

GERMANY

283

Registry Number C 19589/13005/18

TELEGRAM FROM Sir N. Bland (The Hague)

No. 93 Saving.

Dated 28th November, 1939

Received in Registry 2nd December 1939.

C: Germany.

Possibility of peace negotiations.

Summarises conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs who developed the theme that the continuation of the war was madness for all concerned and that only the Bolsheviks would profit by it. This and all the horrors of war could be avoided if Britain came to terms. Germany would probably be ready to meet Britain a long way in regarding Czecho-Slovakia and to some extent Poland though not Austria.

He thought an approach might be made through German high command. Sir N. Bland replied that it was impossible to rely on the word of anyone in authority in Germany. Comments on Mr. van Kleffens's proposals.

Last Paper.

C. 19528

(Minutes.)

C. Division. Please check No: see C18386

see also C19611

It follows from this Foreign Office document that the attempts to knock together a united German-British "anti-Bolshevik" front were carried on even after the outbreak of the war.

"The final tribunal is our own conscience," Churchill stressed. "We are fighting to reestablish the reign of law... Acting in the name of the Covenant and as virtual mandatories of the League and all it stands for, we have a right, and indeed are bound in duty, to abrogate for a space some of the conventions of the very laws we seek to consolidate and reaffirm... The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its protection and enforcement."

Any objective observer will grant that considering its total isolation, the Soviet Union was compelled of necessity to surround itself with defences with forward lines located at a maximum distance from the vital centres of the country. Inasmuch as we were denied equal rights and equal security at the negotiating table we had to assert these rights on our own.

Third. The advances made by the Germans to the U.S.S.R. and the practrical contacts that led to the conclusion of the August 23 pact occurred when the battles at Khalkhin Gol were at their height. The first intimation of imminent changes in Soviet-German relations was conveyed to Tokyo by Berlin only in the evening of August 21 in a telephone conversation between Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador Oshima.

For the Japanese leadership, which was oriented on military solidarity with the Reich, the news came as a shock which shook the entire "anti-Comintern" setup. The effect of that shock lasted until the very end of the war - Japan's faith in its strategic ally was irreparably undermined. The Hiranuma government resigned. The new cabinet proceeded to devise a military-strategic platform in which large-scale aggression against the Soviet Union was postponed indefinitely.

One of the consequences of the August 23 pact - and a most unexpected and unpleasant one for Berlin - was the conclusion on April 13, 1941, of a pact of neutrality between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Hitler and Ribbentrop did their best to dissuade Tokyo from taking this step. In a memorandum for Berlin, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka (a great admirer of nazism and an ardent advocate of unity with it) maintained that the agreement "does not jeopardize the tripartite pact" and was of great significance for Japan, since it should make "a big impression on Chang Kaishi and make it easier for Japan to negotiate with him." Moreover, "the agreement will strengthen Japan's positions vis-à-vis the United States and Britain." Japan was paying the Germans back in the same counterfeit coin.

Matsuoka's negotiations with the nazi leaders are indicative from many angles. Although they took place in March-April 1941, the Germans confined themselves merely to hinting at the possibility of "complications" with the U.S.S.R., which was later to be interpreted by the Japanese as another indication of Berlin's predilection for separate moves. Tokyo saw in the "infidelity" of its ally justification for playing its own solo part in the aggressors' concert.

Hitler's seemingly firm promise given on April 4, 1941, to "draw immediate conclusions" if Japan became involved in conflict with the U.S. (and also the Soviet Union), made no impression on Matsuoka. Perhaps because this was said after a confusing exposition of the Reich's future relations with the United States.

On March 27, Ribbentrop defined the common task of Germany, Japan and Italy as that of "keeping the U.S.A. out of the war," and advised that action against Britain be taken in such a way as to make it difficult for Roosevelt to help that country. On that same day Hitler qualified as the principal outcome of the tripartite pact the fact that "America is slow in joining the struggle officially." On March 28, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked his German opposite number point-blank: "Will Germany leave the U.S. alone if, after the defeat of Britain, the Americans cease supporting the British Empire?" "Germany," Ribbentrop replied, "has not the slightest interest in war with the United States." For his part, Matsuoka held that it was necessary to reckon with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole, and that "unless we succeed in converting America to our own faith it will be impossible to establish a new order."

Ribbentrop's final observations apparently reflected some hidden currents of thought among the nazi top crust. "Each will dominate in its own sphere," he said. "Germany together with Italy would do so in the European-African region, the United States would have to content itself with the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan.... In the future only the above three spheres of interest would remain as the big power centres." Revelations of this kind could only feed the suspicions of Matsuoka, who believed that war with the United States was inevitable.

Fourth. The economic arrangements under the August 23 pact enabled the U.S.S.R. to acquire urgently needed materials, equipment and technology unavailable at the time on other markets. As is noted in Volume IV of the official study "The German Reich and the Second World War" published in the F.R.G. in 1983, deliveries of German equipment contributed to the intensive development of the Soviet war industry.

Fifth. The Soviet Union showed the world that it intended and was able firmly to uphold its interests and to pursue its own policy in world affairs. It was demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. could foil the machinations of its imperialist adversaries. This was a lesson to those who expected the Soviet land to be "magnanimous" - to lynch ourselves or to offer little resistance to such a procedure. Self-sacrifice on our part was perhaps the only thing that would have pleased London and not disappointed Washington.

To sum up. It proved impossible to avoid war. The shortsighted policy of the anti-communists ensconsed in government offices in London, Paris and Washington made the tragic denouement inevitable. What prevailed was the policy, common to capitalist diplomacy, of denying the "object" of expansion the right to have its own opinion and to uphold it.

The division of countries according to might, wealth, mode of government or biology into the privileged and the underprivileged, supreme confidence in one's own infallibility and the concept that other countries and peoples have "an exaggerated notion of independence" was and still is something more than the world outlook of the West.

All this manifested itself most strikingly when the Soviet Union was faced with the need to draw practrical conclusions from the mounting threat of war emanating from the aggressor and from the obstruction on the part of the Western "democracies," from their hypocrisy, the desire of the imperialist powers to resolve their contradictions at our expense. The U.S.S.R. was obliged to ensure its own survival, to see to it that there would be no repetition of the invasion of the Soviet Republic by the main predators in any combination, to see to it that the first blows struck at our country should not be fatal.

How successful we were in coping with this task is another matter. Today, when the cards have been laid on the table, when one can see where the designs and the realities coincided and where they diverged, everything is comparatively clear. In 1939, however, we had to grope in the dark, trying to find out, to guess when the war would break out and what would be the main theatres of hostilities for Germany and Japan, who would take what positions when the diplomats fell silent and the guns began to speak. The Soviet Union paid a heavy price for the mistakes - its own and those of others.

It is now the year 1987. It will soon be fifty years since the war ended. Contrary to Oswald Spengler's prediction, two generations have not known war. There are many reasons for this. Not the least is that politicians are coming to realize that there are no, and neither can there be, two securities - one for the select and the other for all the rest. The crude delusion of the past - that one can remain safe while other peoples experience ordeals - has cost mankind tens of millions of lives. ■

ABOUT NEW THINKING AGAIN

SERGEI BARUZDIN

I shall begin by saying that our multinational literature has largely anticipated and, consequently, set the scene for the revolutionary changes now under way in our country which we refer to as perestroika. Long before perestroika began many fiction writers and publicists sounded the alarm about the legacy left to us by the years of the personality cult, voluntarism and stagnation. They had much difficulty reaching their readers.

I mean, specifically, Yuri Trifonov, Vladimir Tendryakov, Nodar Dumbadze, Victor Astafyev, Mustai Karim, Mikolas Slutskis, Oles Gonchar, Valentin Rasputin, Vasily Belov, Grant Matevosian, Vasil Bykov, Bulat Okudzhava, Victor Kozko, Rasul Gamzatov, Kaisyn Kuliyev, Mikhail Dudin, and Boris Mozhayev, Ivan Vasilyev, Yuri Chernichenko, Anatoly Strelyany, Alexander Nikishin, Anatoly Agranovsky, Anatoly Ivashchenko, Alexander Nezhny and many others.

Now literature seems, as it were, to have stepped aside.

Except, that is, for journalists attacking current and potential opponents of perestroika rather than past shortcomings.

As for prose writers and poets, they are content to say nothing and bide their time.

This is probably all to the good. Who needs time-serving poetry and prose concocted in a hurry?

Playwrights, once in the vanguard, are also silent.

Once topical plays like "A Silver Wedding," "Speak Up" and others are not up to the present standard of glasnost.

Unfortunately, the cinema - even the best films - merely illustrates current events instead of interpreting them. This is only natural, I admit, because real art cannot keep up a running commentary on the progress of the dramatic changes our reality is presently undergoing.

And now, literature apart, a few words about perestroika proper. It is going all right, but the going is hard, as we know from press, television and radio reports. My personal experiences in Moscow and during my recent trips to Kazakhstan, the Penza Region and Byelorussia also bear evidence of this.

Why so?

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We own up to our troubles and failures perfectly frankly, without holding anything back, but we still do not have much to show for it: our industry, agriculture, social sphere life, culture, public health, and secondary and higher education all leave much to be desired.

Explanations abound.

They range from bad weather to inefficient inter-factory cooperation, from criminal negligence on the part of executive officials to continued bureaucratic tutelage from the top, from an erratic supply of components to the poor quality of steel and other raw materials, from flagrant rudeness to customers in the services sphere to the suppression of private enterprise permitted by law.

I do not think that the democratization of our society presupposes impunity. Neither do I think that the humanism of our society presupposes all-forgivingness.

Unfortunately, impunity and all-forgivingness are common practice here, especially in the middle echelon.

We have replaced incompetents in many high places, so why are we shy of replacing, or punishing according to their deserts, those in the economic, Party, government, trade union and even Komsomol bodies who, while sounding off about the need for perestroika, are actually sabotaging it?

Mind you, much now rests on this so-called middle echelon.

There is another dangerous development I'd like to mention.

Against the background of perestroika and bitter self-criticism, our mass media come up, now and then, with window-dressing reports on "end results," on the "performance of state quality inspection commissions," on "a new wave of competition," and so on.

Meanwhile, the new Don combine harvesters malfunction; vegetables are left to rot in fields and warehouses; farm machines stand idle at the height of a harvesting campaign for want of petrol; shops offer little worth buying; clothes for a toddler are not to be found anywhere for love or money; school uniforms are rationed; Moscow's Central Market charges old, pre-perestroika prices (meat, for instance, is eight rubles a kilo).

Demagogues, those at the Writers' Union included, use glasnost to settle old scores, and remain as clannish as they were before all the blessed changes came.

One oughtn't really to blame them for that. What can you expect from a person devoid of talent? Formerly, he adapted to the situation and somehow got by writing "to order." What is he to do now?

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It is my profound conviction that the progress of perestroika is retarded chiefly by the absence of the new thinking Mikhail Gorbachev has publicly called for.

This new thinking is, perhaps, more apparent in international relations than in our domestic practice. The middle echelon, which is offering the most vigorous resistance to perestroika, has not yet learned to think in a new way; neither have all of us, most unfortunately.

WHY ARE THE NOTIONS OF "END RESULT" AND "QUALITY" SO UNPOPULAR IN THE SPHERE OF CULTURE?

May I dwell on the situation in the spheres I have directly to do with - culture, art, literature.

Volumes could be written on the subject, but a magazine article allows me only space enough to outline a most serious problem, which merits lengthy discussion, thorough study and profound analysis.

I mean the activity of such an instrument of public self-awareness as the Soviet Culture Fund, set up recently in the period of perestroika - and, I believe, thanks to perestroika. The noble idea

behind the establishment of this fund was to keep up our national dignity, and preserve the country's cultural treasures which, until quite recently, had not even been duly inventoried (please excuse my using this technical term in such context). The Fund is rapidly gaining internationlal prestige, coming to play multifarious roles in our national life, and pooling a multitute of hitherto disparate efforts to preserve and augment beauty.

But look what's happening. The Fund is a voluntary public body which depends for its activity on the enthusiasm of devotees who have never been able to find a common language and reach full understanding with such serious organizations as the State Planning Committee or the Ministry of Finance. The state should not shift off its duties (which are solely within its powers to perform) onto a public foundation. I mean, specifically, the duty to save numerous cultural objects which are in a sorry plight to this day.

It was certainly a fine and noble thing to do to give an all-star benefit concert with the proceeds contributed towards restoration of the church where Pushkin and Goncharova were married and making it a concert hall. While appreciating this charitable gesture, we cannot help asking ourselves whether it offers the key to the problem of restoring hundreds, even thousands, of badly neglected architectural relics; of breathing life into hundreds of provincial picture galleries, most of whose treasures (80 per cent, in fact) are gathering dust in cold storage; of salvaging numerous libraries and provincial theatres that need immediate help.

All this requires money and a centralized effort. My impression is, however, that many government organizations are trying to shift all these responsibilities, on the sly, to the representative - but still publicly run - Fund on the assumption that it is better equipped to shoulder them. Is that the case?

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We all breathed easier when we felt that the artificial bureaucratic barriers preventing our work reaching readers, spectators and listeners were being removed. We are all of us full of new ideas and engaging in innovative creative quests but, alas, economic perestroika has not as yet been extended to the sphere of art and literature.

There is a shortage of cine- and still cameras, and the quality of Soviet film is not up to world standards.

There are no mechanization facilities for publishing and editorial offices, and our printing is in the Stone Age.

The very rooms we work in are not fit for normal creative activity.

All this is a result of red tape, overcentralized planning, conservative resistance to all that is new, rational and up-to-date. In our sphere there are no such notions as "end result" and "quality," and no material incentives are offered even if you bring an enormous profit to the state.

Whether you work well or badly, whether the magazine you edit is good or bad, the difference does not show in your pay. Incidentally, the editor-in-chief of a literary journal draws a salary equal to that of a tractor driver or a combine-harvester operator, while a proofreader's pay is below subsistence level, which is a shame. This explains personnel fluctuations in our proofreading and other technical services.

Our magazine Druzhba Narodov brings the state a net profit of 8.5 million a year.

We do not get as much as 80 copecks of this profit.

How are wages and salaries to be adjusted under the circumstances?

How are we to encourage the more capable and industrious workers?

Just in passing: we play host to foreign delegations daily, but who is to pay for the tea or coffee we are supposed to serve on such occasions? So far we've been solving this problem by chipping in a few rubles each.

Is this normal? I did not put this question to the director of Izvestia publishing house, which brings out our magazine because I know that such matters do not come within his terms of reference. So I consulted his "superior."

"Mind you, Izvestia Publishers lose money on such magazines as Voprosy Literaturi, Teatr, and Sovetskaya Literatura in foreign translations," he told me. "What do you say to that?"

"You can easily make up for the losses with the profit brought in by Novy Mir, Inostrannaya Literatura and our own Druzhba Narodov, but we also want a share of this profit." The "superior" agreed with me, but did nothing.

NEW THINKING PRESUPPOSES EVERY POSITION BEING FILLED BY THE RIGHT MAN, WHO BEARS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JOB ASSIGNED TO HIM

What about our copyright?

As of now, this copyright can protect mediocre literature only.

A smart graphomaniac, whether or not a member of the Writers' Union, who turns out a bulky novel a year, has an advantage over a man of letters who labours over a manuscript for decades.

The former receives 100 per cent of his emoluments annually, while the latter - whose work stays on best sellers' lists and is republished for 10, 20 and 30 years and brings enormous profits to the publishers (i.e., to the state) - gets a mere thirty per cent.

We talk a lot about our concern for children, who are commonly referred to as a privileged class. However, we meet only 30 to 35 per cent of the demand for children's literature.

By the same copyright, a "children's" writer gets a fee one fifth to one tenth that of an author writing for adults.

Is it any wonder, therefore, that children's literature, regarded by most really talented writers as not worth their while, draws innumerable "contributions" from hacks and graphomaniacs who take advantage of books for children being in short supply?

I know that the above does not apply to literature alone.

Artists, musicians, actors, film-makers and TV people are in a no less difficult position.

The State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance are sticking to the bad old tradition of ruling us all with an iron rod and depriving us of our legal earnings. It is ridiculous that the Writers' Union has no right to spend a single ruble - out of its own, not state funds - without the knowledge of the Ministry of Finance.

Consequently, new thinking is needed in this sphere, too.

Why is it that while in the economic sphere we have finally arrived at the simple truth that one ought to be paid according to one's work, the situation in the sphere of culture remains unchanged?

In the economic sphere, personal initiative is given every encouragement; in the arts, the rights of the creative individual who, by virtue of his trade, works on his own, are infringed upon in every way.

●

To sum up, what we need is new thinking from top to bottom. Especially in the middle echelon.

New thinking presupposes every position being filled by the right man, who bears full responsibility for the job assigned to him, works to the best of his ability and makes his own decisions in his line of duty instead of constantly seeking authoritative instructions for the handling of any, even the most trivial matters.

New thinking is not words about perestroika, but perestroika itself, that is, a concrete effort.

Otherwise, glasnost may be reduced to a mere formality, and perestroika may fail to bring real and tangible results.

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

Mission to revolutionary Russia

From our special correspondent
SERGEI GOLYAKOV

A close acquaintance of Chicherin, Dzerzhinsky and Gorky, Hermod Lannung, the prominent Danish politician, was an eyewitness of the revolutionary events in Petrograd in 1917.

When I enquired about his health, he smiled. The question was of more than formal relevance to Hermod Lannung, 92, an eminent lawyer, one of the leaders of the bourgeois Radical Liberal Party of Denmark, Honorary President of the World Association of World Federalists, Doctor Emeritus of Moscow University, to mention just some of his honorary titles.

Joking about his age, he said:

"Some people feel that in old age their eyes move to the backs of their heads. They see what is behind but not what lies ahead. They live on memories and not on hopes. So far I haven't noticed this happening to me."

Lannung had turned 90 when a new burden was placed on his shoulders. His irrepressible optimism, stamina and enthusiasm secured him a special role even in the traditionally young movement for peace. In December 1985 he was elected president of the international preparatory committee for the International Year of Peace Congress. A convinced pacifist and staunch advocate of the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes and conflicts, he rose to the challenge of his new mission. He drew on his vast political experience which included some twenty years with the United Nations, nine years as head of the Council of Europe's Committee on Legal Cooperation, and involvement in drafting the main international human rights conventions.

His eyes light up when he speaks of his intention to visit Moscow for the celebrations on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October revolution.

"I've already received an invitation," Lannung said, not without pride, as we sat down to talk at his desk. "I'm looking forward to the trip. I was in the Soviet Union for the 50th and 60th anniversaries of the revolution. But this year's celebration will be a very special occasion, I think. Your perestroika and glasnost have captured the imagination of people the world over. The Soviet Union is on the move again. I anticipate that when I come to Moscow I will experience the same elation as in the unforgettable year of 1917.

10 Sergievskaya Street

Hermod Lannung is not only a contemporary, but an eyewitness of the Great October Revolution. Having lived in Soviet Russia from 1917 to 1919, and again from 1922 to 1924, he was secretary at the Danish embassy, a representative of the Danish Red Cross, and from 1922, commissioner of the Russian mission of Fridtjof Nansen, the legendary Norwegian Polar explorer.

"Your revolution was the high point of my life," says Lannung. "I saw how a new life, an undreamed-of world were in its birth throes. If you stand over an infant's cradle from its birth, you inevitably feel responsible for that child. You want to do something good for that child. This was the case with me."

Among the names of his close acquaintances and friends of those years, Lannung mentions Chicherin, Lunacharsky, Dzerzhinsky, Peters, Gorky and Chaliapin. He saw Lenin and heard him speak on many occasions, and it was by sheer accident that he did not meet Lenin in person. Lannung was in Lenin's office at the Kremlin to receive a permit to travel in Soviet territory for the members of Nansen's mission. The permit had to be signed by Lenin.

In January 1924, Hermod Lannung marched with the mourning procession from the Paveletsky railway terminal to the House of the Unions' Hall of Columns. Together with Lenin's wife, Krupskaya, he stood in the guard of honour over Lenin's body.

How did his Russian Odyssey begin?

Hermod Lannung was born into a farmer's family in an obscure, quiet village lost in the plains of Zealand Island, Denmark's main granary. After finishing a village school, he was admitted to Denmark's most prestigious gymnasium, the Soro Academy.

"It so happened that at that time one of our teachers decided to study Russian to be able to read the Russian classics in the original. He invited his pupils to join him in his studies. Several pupils volunteered, including myself. Of course, it did not occur to me that this step would influence my whole future."

In early 1917 Lannung, then a law

student at Copenhagen University, read a newspaper announcement: "The embassy of Denmark in Petrograd urgently needs staff members fluent in Russian." Lannung made his decision instantly. He applied for and got the job. In early May he reached Petrograd by a circuitous route via Sweden and Finland to avoid the battlefields of World War I.

"The Danish mission was headquartered at No. 10 Sergievskaya Street, not far from Liteiny Avenue. It was a few minutes' walk from the city centre. True, diplomats did not often venture into the streets. They were alarmed by what was happening. The staffs of embassies and allied military missions perferred to stay in their offices devising plans to 'save' Russia.

"There were milling crowds in the squares, at street intersections, railway stations, and in parks. Rallies were being held continuously. Some speakers cursed the Provisional Government, calling for an immediate end to the war, for peace, land and bread. Others were equally vocal, arguing that Russia had to observe its allied commitments, and accusing Lenin and the Bolsheviks of treason.

"Different interests clashed. There were so many classes, parties, temperaments, and personalities vying with each other. Whom to heed? Whom to follow? I don't think those were easy decisions to make for a semiliterate worker, peasant or soldier."

Lannung recalls watching films about those events made many years later. The directors sought to dramatize the events. But their pictures of the revolution were icon-like. Its face was stern, but bright and clear. The viewer found himself in a confined world in which there was no room for doubt.

"But there were doubts. The February Revolution opened up the prospect of bourgeois democratic development for Russia. To many this seemd a tempting prospect, promising deliverance from social ills. It took a man of Lenin's genius, will and determination to convince the masses that the road of bourgeois reform was not for Russia."

On the morning after the storming of the Winter Palace, Lannung went to Palace Square.

"What did a foreigner feel that morning as he stood in the place where history was being made? Was he aware of the significance of what was happening?" I asked Lannung.

"Of course, many foreigners found it hard to get used to the idea that the old regime had crumbled and ceased to exist. On the other hand, it was clear to an impartial observer that for the first time in many months Russia at last had a political power that knew what it wanted. People might feel differently about it. But the fact remained that the revolution had triumphed and was determined to defend itself."

30 bags of sugar

In mid-1918, Lannung moved to Moscow to join the Danish Red Cross mission there.

The mission was helping foreign nationals stranded in Russia. Times were hard. The mission provided foreigners with food and medical supplies. It inquired about the fates of those who had been arrested for counterrevolutionary activities.

These inquiries often brought Lannung into contact with Dzerzhinsky and, more frequently, with his deputy, Peters.

"We formed an excellent relationship. They were highly educated, intellectual people who took our concerns to heart. The revolution was well disposed towards those who were prepared to accept it. It was not thirsting for blood. We were aware of the humanity of the new government in our daily work. They were very cooperative. We had very close ties with the Centre for Prisoners of War and Refugees which discharged the functions of the Red Cross in Russia at the time."

In the autumn of 1918, Lannung went to German-occupied Kiev to see and alleviate, as he could, the plight of Russian prisoners of war there.

"I was given a special train carriage and several people to accompany me. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin, with whom I later became close friends, speeded me on my way and provided me with the necessary papers.

"I was to cross the Russian-German front line and pass through areas which were under martial law. I was stepping into the unknown. My chances of success were almost nil. Still, I decided to try, and eventually reached Kiev. It struck me that the food situation in the Ukraine was fairly tolerable compared with that in Central Russia. Sugar, which had the price of gold in Moscow, was plentiful here. This was an excellent opportunity to replenish the meagre stocks of the Red Cross. I bought 30 bags of sugar and had them loaded into my railway carriage. This cargo nearly cost me my life.

"One night the train stopped on the bank of a wide river near Baranovichi. The bridge ahead had been destroyed. The only way to cross the river was over the ice.

"At the cost of great effort, I hired several horse-drawn sleds for my priceless cargo. Until then the cargo had been securely hidden from view in the carriage. But when loaded onto the sleds, the bags of sugar attracted everyone's attention and aroused suspicion. At first they took me for an ordinary black-marketeer, but when I showed Red Cross papers, they thought that I was a spy into the bargain. They decided to shoot me on the spot. Nobody would listen to me. Hatred of speculators was stronger than any argument. The situation was becoming critical. The Red Guards were about to carry out their threat when an energetic young man from the Centre for POWs and Refugees appeared on the scene. He explained who I was, saying that I was a great friend of the Soviet government and asked my captors to help me."

In the spring of 1919, Lannung decided to return home to continue his education. Before he left he was summoned by Chicherin. Chicherin praised his noble mission and asked for his cooperation in getting 100,000 rubles to Switzerland. The money was intended for the families of Russian political émigrés who could not afford to pay their way home.

"I was very flattered by this request as it showed that the Soviet government trusted me.

"I tried to obtain a Swiss visa through the Danish ambassador in Berlin. But when he learned the purpose of my trip and my recent past, the clerk at the consulate took me for a communist agent. As a result I was refused a visa. I had to remit the money by post. It was not until I received confirmation that the money had reached the addressees that I returned to Denmark."

Famine

Three years later, Hermod Lannung returned to Russia. Severe drought had left the country without bread. Famine had struck many areas. Lannung's mission was to help famine victims with money raised in various countries by the Nansen committee and the European Student Relief.

"I was in charge of relief in the largest area, the whole of the south of Russia, including the Volga area. The situation there was desperate. We gave food relief to students and professors. We opened canteens for them. My mission got off to an inauspicious start. I went down with typhus. When I recovered I was able to do more travelling in the famine-stricken areas. Our resources were limited, much less than those of the Americans who were also sending food to the Volga area. But it seems to me that we were more honest.

"For some reason most of the members of the American Relief Administration (ARA) were servicemen. They behaved

arrogantly, frequently complaining about the alleged uncooperativeness of the local authorities who, they claimed, made things difficult for them. In reality it was the other way around. Hoover's people said they hated the Bolsheviks and predicted their imminent collapse. This gave rise to conflicts.

"There were some ill-wishers in the Nansen mission as well. The staff was multinational with its central office in Moscow headed by an Englishman, Harold Gibson. In the southern department headquartered in Kharkov, I worked with the Norwegian Vidkun Quisling for a while. I'm sure you are familiar with that name. During the second world war it became a symbol of treachery and collaboration with the nazis. Quisling was a zealous supporter of the nazis' racial theory, and was anything but sympathetic towards the Bolsheviks. A former military attaché at the Norwegian embassy in Russia, he had links with the allied military missions' personnel who hated the revolution. One could imagine how he felt about working with the Nansen mission.

In July 1923, the Soviet government, through the newspaper Izvestia, thanked the Nansen mission for its charitable activities. At the same time I was offered the position of head of the mission in Moscow as Gibson had been obliged hastily to leave Soviet Russia following the Curzon ultimatum."

The secretary to the mission was Sergei Tolstoi, a grandson of the writer Leo Tolstoi. Through him Lannung was able to extend his circle of acquaintances among the Russian intelligentsia.

What was the intelligentsia's attitude to the revolution?

"The attitude was mixed. Scientists were probably the first intellectuals to understand what was happening. University professors felt it their duty to continue to train the personnel the country so badly needed. Artists were a more difficult case. Many of them feared that the masses, swept by the wave of revolution, would destroy the pockets of civilization and culture together with the old world. Such fears were even expressed by Gorky, who initially took a very negative stand with regard to the October revolution.

"But as time went by, sentiments changed. Lenin, Lunacharsky and Dzerzhinsky did much to ensure that the intelligentsia accepted the new government."

T-shirts with red stars

Lest time and new responsibilities should undermine his links with the Soviets, Lannung, upon his return home in the autumn of 1924, founded the Denmark-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society, the first such society in the world. Wherever he was and whatever office he held, his interest in, and sympathy for, the Soviet Union did not wane. This was the case during the second world war.

Lannung recalls:

"The day after nazi Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., the Soviet embassy in Hitler-occupied Denmark was sealed off, and its staff and the staff of the trade mission were cut off from the outside world.

"I was very worried about their fate. I knew many diplomats personally. Andrei Plakhin, Counsellor at the U.S.S.R. Plenipotentiary's Office, was a friend of mine. I decided that I had to meet them to cheer them up. At my own peril, I went to the embassy building. But the guards did not let me in. I had to get a special permit from the police. The police refused. They tried to dissuade me and to scare me with the possible consequences of my rash act. I then appealed to Foreign Minister Skavenius. He was in the Germans' good books, and eventually I received permission. I had expected to see crestfallen, worried people. Nothing of the kind. Plakhin was in high spirits, offered me champagne, and throughout the evening told me to be calm. 'We are sure to win the war,' he said as we parted.

"When after the war he returned to Denmark as Soviet ambassador, I told him what the consequences of that visit had been for me. The Germans were not pleased. They blacklisted me as a Communist agent. On the night of August 28, 1943, I was arrested by the Gestapo to become the only Danish member of Parliament to be interned in a concentration camp as a hostage. But I do not regret it. I met some wonderful people in the camp. They were dedicated fighters against war and fascism. It was a great honour to be with such people."

Lannung's first major peace action was in the 1920s when he organized an international peace conference of youth organizations, Liberal and Radical parties in Copenhagen. In 1930 he made a speech on "Disarmament: the Task for Europe" at an international congress of young Radicals in Berlin.

"We demanded the abolition of mortars and incendiary bombs then. We are now living in a nuclear age. But we still often think in a medieval way. Crude force in international affairs, the primacy of military strength over sound political thinking - all these are still very much in evidence. Our civilization is on the brink of self-destruction. And yet we still cannot understand that we have come to the fateful line."

Why is this so? According to Lannung, the root of the evil is the gap between matter and spirit. Since the second world war many Western countries have made a great leap towards material well-being. People have grown wealthier but at the same time spiritually poorer. They think only of themselves and their own comfort, without noticing what is going on around them. This has engendered civic infantilism, but nuclear war is a psychological as well as a political phenomenon. It exerts pressure on the consciousness. One can react to pressure in different ways. One can try to get rid of the initial cause, or ignore the danger and brush it aside. The second way is easier. Besides, you are constantly being told that politics is the prerogative of statesmen and diplomats. There is nothing an ordinary person can do.

This philosophy is attractive because it justifies passivity. But this is an immoral position. People must act, and the sooner the better. This is the first time humanity has been faced with the question to be or not to be. Inaction in this situation is inadmissible.

I asked Hermod Lannung if he saw any cause for optimism in the modern world. What promising changes did he see?

His replies came promptly:

"Your perestroika. It is carrying on the cause of revolutionary self-renewal and has far-reaching political implications abroad. You are inviting all countries to peaceful competition. You are proposing to resolve historical disputes not by force of arms, but by force of example. This idea was first expressed by Lenin. Today it has received a new lease of life.

"Your country's past has not been without errors and setbacks. But now you are talking about them openly. You call this new thinking, and are looking for new ways of grappling with your domestic and international problems. Such a sense of purpose is very appealing.

"Our young people are wearing T-shirts with red stars and portraits of Gorbachev with the words Glasnost and U.S.S.R. in Russian. I do not remember such a thing ever happening before.

"If I were a little younger," he added with a smile, "I would wear such a T-shirt myself. Alas, my youth is gone. It has remained in Soviet Russia.

"I know that you have not done everything you intended to. There is a lot you don't like about your society. It has yet to give man everything it is capable of giving. That is why it needs to be restructured. This means that the revolution is still going on. So I have no right to feel an old man."

Copenhagen-Moscow

Seeking political asylum

Who can expect to be granted political asylum in the Soviet Union?

Questions from New Times are answered by the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Alliance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the U.S.S.R., Doctor of Medicine DMITRY VENEDIKTOV.

What does the expression "to seek political asylum" mean and when did it originate?

The granting of asylum for political reasons (religious, racial, national reasons in the past) has long existed in international law and international relations. Warring countries have always readily helped the adversaries of their rivals.

Strictly speaking, the notion of political asylum is associated with the French Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the French Constitution of 1793, which proclaimed the right of a state to grant asylum to persons persecuted in their countries for political (then mainly atheistic) views.

What documents record man's right to political asylum?

Questions pertaining to political asylum, as well as to refugees, have been discussed many times at international forums, among them the United Nations. The numerous resolutions, declarations and other documents adopted have different legal status, but their gist is that the granting of political asylum is a sovereign right of a state. On the other hand, the right to political asylum is one of the human rights envisaged by United Nations documents. Clause 1 of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. in 1948, reads: "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." The 1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum confirms that asylum should be granted by every state.

Who makes the decision on the granting of political asylum in the Soviet Union?

This is the prerogative of the Soviet government. And the Alliance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies assumes the care of those who are granted asylum in our country.

Why is it that this function is assumed by your organization, whose activity is mainly associated with medical aid on a world scale?

Care for foreign citizens persecuted in their native countries and granted asylum in the U.S.S.R. means the fulfilment by the Red Cross of a humanitarian duty.

You have thus almost defined the category of persons who can expect to be granted asylum in the Soviet Union.

The stand of the U.S.S.R. on this matter is summed up in Article 38 of the Constitution. "The U.S.S.R. grants the right to asylum to foreigners persecuted for defending the interests of the working people and the cause of peace, or for participation in revolutionary and national liberation movements, or for progressive social and political, scientific or other creative activity."

Does not the very fact of granting asylum to opponents of certain regimes constitute a sort of interference in the internal affairs of those countries?

No, this is both the fulfilment of a humanitarian duty and compliance with international law. I would like to point out the principled nature of the Soviet approach. The U.S.S.R. grants asylum not to opponents of governments and regimes but to people with progressive views and humanist ideas. This means above all that the Soviet Union discharges its internationalist duty with regard to those who oppose colonialist and nationalist oppression. This is a manifestation of the internationalist solidarity of the working people.

Who have been granted asylum and protection by our country in the period of Soviet power?

Immediately after the October Revolution of 1917, our country granted asylum to all revolutionaries threatened in their countries with political reprisals, death sentences, imprisonment or hard labour. On November 30, 1922, Pravda reported that the International Red Aid organization had been established on the Comintern's recommendation for the purpose of political support and material assistance to victims of terror persecuted for their participation in the class struggle in their countries. The organization existed for a quarter-century and raised over that period 87 million rubles for the relief fund for revolutionaries, and assumed care of over 12,000 political emigrants and members of their families. The assistance to the Spanish republic and the rescue of three thousand Spanish children deserve special mention...

And who has found asylum in the Soviet Union in recent years?

Large groups of Greek emigrants who found shelter in the U.S.S.R. in the postwar years and during the rule of the "black colonels," Iranian and Chilean politicians, representatives of progressive forces in Latin America, Asia and Africa, who were persecuted for their views, and victims of racist and fascist regimes. But I must admit that we avoid mentioning names, as, for example, in cases where the emigrants have relatives in their native counties who might become targets for persecution. But there are other, well known, cases. The American biochemist Arnold Lockshin and his family left the U.S.A. in October 1986 because of persecution to which he was subjected for his activities in the peace movement. This August the Soviet government expressed its readiness to grant asylum to the campaigner for the rights of American Indians, Leonard Peltier. We are ready to help.

What about the life in the Soviet Union of persons who have made the serious, at times tragic decision to leave their country, to emigrate?

This decision is often motivated by more than just concern for their own lives and the lives of their relatives. The choice in favour of the Soviet Union is a manifestation of their trust in our country, of their conscious acceptance of our fundamentally different spiritual values and social relations. It is our duty to do everything possible to guarantee that these people do not feel lonely and excluded from the mainstream of life. What they are given in the U.S.S.R. is not only asylum. They are also granted every right that Soviet people have, except for the suffrage. Nor do they have to do military service. They are given jobs, helped to get an education or learn a trade, and granted material and medical aid.

And what about aid to political prisoners in countries with totalitarian regimes?

We continue to render such aid through the mediation of the International Red Cross. The charter of our organization requires us to aid persons who are subjected to physical or moral suffering, who are compelled to leave their country and seek asylum. Unfortunately, the number of such persons is increasing....

Interviewer LEONID MLECHIN

The fourth world - title match

The match for the world chess title between the present holder of the title Garri Kasparov and ex-champion Anatoly Karpov starts in Seville (Spain) on October 10. Not more than 24 games will be played, but if one of the two scores a six-game lead before that, he will be proclaimed world champion. In the event of a tie, Garri Kasparov retains the crown.

On the eve of the match the two grandmasters kindly granted interviews for the magazine.

GARRI KASPAROV

What does it feel like having to contest the world title for the fourth time in three years?

...morally?

Anything but easy. It is far too often for such major matches. A sort of numbing of the emotions takes place. Somewhere deep down in the nervous system the sense of the greatness and importance of the occasion is lost. The match becomes a routine affair, whereas for anyone connected with chess, without mentioning the players, it should be an extraordinary occasion.You have to prepare for it, tune yourself up for it in a very special way. But when you have to bring your body and your nervous system to the highest state of preparedness so often, you become accustomed to the stresses. The finer points of your psychological training begin to wear off. You get used to your opponent (he remains one and the same), and you get used to the idea of a match (conditions are usually similar)...

So your aim is to prepare yourself for this match as if it were the first or second such match in your life - as if it were the greatest event in your life. You have to force yourself to see it as such. This poses new problems. If in the past one might have overestimated the psychological pressure, now you could well underestimate it.

Should victory come my way, the moral satisfaction such a marathon would bring would be the fact that it took Karpov ten years to win the world title three times, while - perhaps - I might achieve the same thing in three years.

...and physically?

Matches for the world title require the mobilization of all the resources of the body, and so they naturally leave one completely drained. More than 100 games in such matches in just three years - it must be the last time such a thing happens. Subjecting a person to such stresses is not quite humane. Although one does not usually complain about it. Each of us taking part in the match probably has his own way of keeping himself in peak condition. My way is running five kilometres along a sunny sandy beach each day, spending an hour practically every day playing football and another hour playing tennis, and, of course, swimming, since my training sessions take place on the Caspian coast.

...and what about new ideas?

The three previous matches advanced chess in many directions, although our search in the field of gambits often ran parallel. As a result, they proved much more profound than the present-day level of theory. Today many chess players try to avoid commenting on our games for the simple reason that none has yet made an in-depth analysis, and without very profound study it is hard to understand why Kasparov or Karpov made that particular choice.

I think that when it comes to new ideas the problems facing both Karpov and myself are similar. Too much has been achieved in a short space of time, and so now we have to delve deeper and deeper. In each match, in each game, in order to win you have to make a step forward, and that is becoming more and more difficult. It is hard to reconcile yourself to the idea that all your previous research is already out of date, that it is no longer enough to dig deeper, that you have to move in new directions, and that is much harder - which direction will bring the best results. Will you choose the right strategy or not? But that new discoveries will be made in the coming match - that I don't doubt for a second.

...and what will the match do to popularize chess?

Of course the matches for the world title help popularize chess. Interest in chess is immense nowadays and continues to grow. The part played by our matches in this mounting interest is hard to determine exactly. But the very fact that this match is to be layed not in the Soviet Union, but in another part of the world, has greatly promoted this mounting interest, since it has become not a national but an international event.

What kind of coach should the world champion's team have?

At the beginning of my career in big-time chess it was not up to me to choose a coach. Those with whom I had something in common joined my team. They were not well known in the chess world, but they were prepared to work and work hard, and believed in me.

That was how the first team was formed. Unfortunately, it no longer exists. I suppose that is only natural: once the main goal has been achieved things tend to break up.

At present half my team is made up of new people. This was not the result of any special efforts. Alexander Nikitin, who was my coach from my school years, remains chief coach. The Lvov grandmaster Iosif Dorfman also remains on the team. He was with us at all the previous matches, and that is by no means unimportant. Two new assistants have joined the team.

I felt it would be good to have another grandmaster on the team, a good analyst, specializing in end games, and I invited Sergei Dolmatov. He's from Moscow, a good friend of mine and about the same age. We've played together from children's tournaments on, and our relations have always remained good.

Now with the changes in the chess world, the formation of a Grandmasters' Association, the younger generation is beginning to unite and our alliance seems quite natural. The other new member, Zurab Azmaiparashvili, an international master from Tbilisi, also belongs to my generation, and he can and wants to work. But, most important, he fits in perfectly into the kind of team I would like to have. I hope to retain the democratic traditions that reigned in the old team in the new one as well.

What were your impressions of your reconnaissance trip to Seville?

I think the organizational aspect of the match deserves top marks. The hall of the Royal Lope de Vega Theatre where we are playing is immense and has excellent acoustics. That is imortant for chess

players, otherwise the reaction of the audience can disturb them. Symmetrical planning allows both playeres to have similar rest rooms. The stage is big.

Without wishing to offend anyone, I think that the match in Seville will be played in the best hall in the history of world chess championships. Seville itself is a very interesting city with its mixture of European and Moorish architecture. The weather in October is similar to that of September in Baku. And the overall atmosphere, bearing in mind the popularity of chess in Spain, should be ideal for the world-title match.

Interviewer
VITALY MELIK-KARAMOV

ANATOLY KARPOV

How is the match site chosen and how important is the choice for the players?

Among the cities contending to host the match were Sochi (U.S.S.R., prize fund one million Swiss francs), Seattle (U.S.A., one million), Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates, 2.25 million), Madrid (2 million), and Seville (2.8 million).

I suggested Abu Dhabi, Kasparov favoured Seattle. Since our choices did not coincide, Seville was chosen as the city offering the most prize money. So geographically speaking, the match is being held practically mid-way.

Why is the site so important? A chess match for the world title does not amount to simply placing a chess table and chairs for the two players and letting them play. Also of immense importance are the cultural standards of chess fans, the objectivity of the press centre, and the mood of the people involved in organizing the match. It would seem that these factors do not directly affect the players, as during the match you try to avoid mixing with strangers. But supposing somewhere your coach was not answered as he should have been, or the team leader was not given a proper hearing. They, of course, would never mention it to you, but their mood might be spoilt, and you can't fail to notice it - their mood is always passed on to you.

Spaniards are great chess fans, so I hope the psychological climate in Seville will be "mild."

You were always a champion who continued playing. Did you keep to the rule of playing during the period between matches and on the very eve of a match?

For me the principle of keeping in tip-top form is of decisive significance. You can't do that just by studying games that have been played. Participation in tournaments should of course be combined with constant search. One chess player might need to play 100 games a year, while for another 80 is enough, and yet another can play almost none. Botvinnik, for instance, did not find it necessary to play a lot. Spasski, when he was world champion, also restricted his participation in tournaments. Tahl, on the other hand, was ready to play any number of games. My annual norm is 70-80 games - naturally I'm speaking only about official tournaments.

The thing is that some can play training games while others can't. I belong to the second category. I find it hard to take a game seriously if it isn't "for real." Yet before a match for the world title I believe you have to take a break of 2-3 months, or everything goes haywire.

And did you manage to keep to this rule in the current season?

After my failure in the match with Kasparov I decided to take a "rest"...at the chess board, although, probably, from the point of view of physical strength and nervous energy it was a strain. To avoid listening to commiserations, I immediately went to the tournament in Tilburg and then to the chess olympiade in Dubai. Now I can see that I did the right thing. I won the match against Sokolov, did well at the tournament in Belgium, won the tournament in the Netherlands, and then the one in Spain, in Bilbao. Incidentally, the Bilbao tournament was my 68th win since I became a Master of Sports. That too was something of an achievement, as the previous record set by Alekhin had been 66 tournaments. Yes, the year was a busy one, but it helped me to get over my defeat quickly.

Who's on your team?

International grandmaster Igor Zaitsev, who has been with me for almost ten years, ever since the death of my teacher, my "chess father" Semyon Furman. Zaitsev is the eldest. The other three members - international grandmaster Konstantin Lérner from Lvov and international masters Mikhail Podgaets from Odessa and Elizbar Ubilava from Tbilisi - are of my age. I have known them since childhood and have complete confidence in them.

Do you have a chess computer among your assistants?

So far no, we have to rely on the methods fo our forefathers. True, I believe that when it comes to analyzing games, calculating all the possible variants, a good chess player is better if, of course, he is in good form and fresh. However, an electronic computer is indispensable when it comes to processing data and classification. For instance, when I played against Korchnoy in Baguio (the Philippines) we took with us hundreds of books and they weighed all a quarter of a ton. Yet at times we still lacked something. We are taking no less with us this time. With a computer, one can use information from thousands of books, not hundreds. In a matter of seconds you can find any game that interests you - all you have to do is name the tournament and the chess player. With time at a premium during a match, it becomes clear how important this is.

Why haven't I acquired an electronic computer yet? The crux of the problem is in accumulating the data. That takes a lot of money. A computer has to embrace tens of thousands of games. Probably in the next few years I'll have to consider the matter seriously. As far as I know Kasparov is luckier in this respect: the American company Atari has provided him with a programme for an electronic computer, complete with a data bank.

Do you have to impose certain restrictions on yourself both during preparation for a match and in the course of the match itself?

During a match I don't read any newspapers, nor do I watch any chess programmes on TV. During the run-up to a match, there are practically no restrictions, if you don's count having to work from early morning to late at night. Have I to force myself to do that? At times probably yes. In any job there is a certain amount of drudgery without which no success is possible. Sometimes a game doesn't go well and you begin to think it's time to stop. Then a week or so passes and you again feel a burning desire to sit down at a chess board.

One can guess what Karpov the chess player is dreaming of, but has Karpov the man any unrealized dreams?

I envy people who can sit and do nothing. I can't. But the more you do, the more is piled on your shoulders. And if at the beginning you do everything with pleasure, as time passes you feel vexed when one fine morning you realize that all this need not have happened. How can you refuse to do something for people that is within your power? And how will you ever be able to live with yourself if you do start refusing? And so you continue doing all you can. This, that and something else, and you find you have less time and energy for your son (and worst of all, the time spent on this merry-go-round leaves your soul poorer), and you see your wife fleetingly, with half an eye (imagine how difficult it is for her), and your friends no longer take offence - they only sympathize with you.

So the greatest dream of all proves to be to devote yourself only to the things you'd like to do. To take a walk through the woods without having to remember that in an hour's time you have an important meeting, to spend an evening with your friends, and, finally, to read a book about which you have heard so much that you begin to dream of it.

I know that that will probably never happen, at least not in the next few years. And you begin to think more and more often: is this kind of life the only possible price you have to pay for your devotion to chess, your loyalty to chess? Of course you have to pay for everything. But does the price have to be so high?....

Interviewer
BORIS BALKAREI

The blue sky of fate

ALLA GRACHÊVA

The Chagall exhibition at the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts marks the artist's return to a land with which he never parted in his heart.

Acclaimed by the world as a great Russian artist devoted to his native land, Marc Chagall was until recently denied the right of kinship with it. The French newspaper Le Monde described him as a "son of Vitebsk." The Soviet encyclopaedia described him as a "French painter and graphic artist." That was something that we impressed upon others as well: In the National Gallery in Prague Chagall's works are displayed with French painting and not in the hall of Russian art.

The long-awaited meeting of the artist and his admirers has finally come to pass as thousands queue to see his work in the Pushkin Museum.

Magic Vitebsk

Marc Chagall was born on July 7, 1887, in the small place of Lyozno near Vitebsk, and died at the age of 97 on March 28, 1985, in France. Throughout his lifetime the town of his childhood was a leitmotif of his work and one that commanded his undivided love. Anna Akhmatova described the poem of his painting as "magic Vitebsk."

"I left behind me on your soil, my motherland, the graves of my forefathers and the stones that had been cast away. I did not live by your side, but your joy and your sorrow are reflected in every one of my paintings."

Chagall's works displayed in the Pushkin Museum are the best proof of this. Even when he painted Saint-Paul-de-Vence, where he lived for the last twenty years of his life, a "town rushing down a mountain slope like a flock of sheep," Vitebsk floated over it like an evening cloud in the rays of the setting sun. The artist with his palette and the girl with her bouquet keep the peace over these two poles of Chagall's life.

Time is at a standstill on Chagall's winged clock. Paintings completed ten, thirty and fifty years afterwards, and indeed each one of them, are poetic reminiscences taking the artist back to his youth.

The Vitebsk of a hundred years ago, with its tottering street lamps, winding streets, dilapidated houses, peasant weddings and funeral processions, his home town, sad and gay, transfigured by his undivided love of his birthplace, appears in his painting in all of the pristine beauty the young artist saw in it.

He looks at his native land through the eyes of love and in his work it turns into a kingdom of lovers and fiddlers floating in an ultramarine sky. It is peopled by fantastic animals living fairy-tale existence. There are horses and cows and roosters and fishes floating in the sky in defiance of all the laws of reality. Gravity has no sway over the images of Chagall's universe: some streak through the air, while those on the ground are not sure of foot, like spacemen who have returned to earth after a mission. Unbound by conventions, the artist brings together in his compositions things that cannot be combined, in a way that unifies them and makes them throb to the same heartbeat.

Louis Aragon said of Chagall's fantasy world: "It is a realm of incompatibility where a man is no different from a bird, where a donkey lives in the sky, where everything is turned into a circus act, and where walking topsy-turvy is normal. It requires no explanation, for Chagall's work has a dialectic of its own, akin only to Shakespeare's 'A Midsummer Night's Dream.'"

Chagall's work is autobiographical. He confessed that his art played no part in the lives of his relatives, but that their life influenced his art. "My mother and father were my school. I learned when I looked at my father and saw how hard he worked, how he drank tea, how he smoked, how fatigue took him. I learned when I looked at my mother cooking in the kitchen for her eight children. I grew up later and saw the sky, the sky at night, and the young girls so lovely that I would never dare to touch them. All that was my school. And all that is in my painting."

In his book, "My Life," Chagall recalls his grandfather, a butcher from Lyozno who would climb to the roof, lean against the chimney and enjoy the twilight. He recalls his uncle, a fiddler who would sometimes play in the evening.

It took some time for the green, blue, and lilac fiddlers to play their souls out on the roofs of the log cabins of Chagall's world of colour, as if inviting us to the fairground show of the small town of Vitebsk, a world of many colours warmed by love and humour.

Marc Chagall was dubbed the "fiddler on the roof of modernism." He would not follow any particular school of painting. "I did not want to be like the rest of them, I wanted to see the world in a new way!"

He did not want to paint what he saw with his own eyes. The world within, he said, is more real than the one without.

Arriving in Paris in 1910, when the cubists and fauvists were staging a revolution in the arts, the 23-year-old artist went unmolested by the vogue of the day. He kept his own bearings as he set out from the crossroads of the prevailing artistic trends, and his work retained his own spirit. The paintings of the Paris period displayed at the exhibition show his soaring imagination blend past and present, the Eiffel tower illuminated by a festive rainbow and the timid star over the rooftops of Vitebsk submerged in the quiet of the night.

Anatoly Lunacharski, who was writing a collection of essays about Russian artists in Paris at the time, visited Chagall's studio and identified the most important feature of his work: "He is of interest above all as a poet striving to express his soul graphically, and attaining that goal in a colourful and original way."

Four years later, People's Commissar Lunacharski placed Chagall, who had returned home on the eve of the first world war, in charge of the arts in the province of Vitebsk. Chagall became the head of a school where Kazimir Malevitch, Mstislav Dobuzhinski, El Lissitski, Ivan

Pougny, and Yuri Pen - his own first teacher - taught five hundred young talented people.

On the first anniversary of the revolution the town was decorated by colourful banners painted from sketches by Chagall. A banner showing a man astride a green horse and inscribed "Chagall to Vitebsk" was raised over the art school. Chagall scattered the people of Vitebsk all over the world. Scenes of Vitebsk decorate the UN headquarters, New York's Metropolitan Opera, the cathedrals in Rheims, Metz, and Zurich and the ceiling of the Paris Opera. To use Pasternak's phrase, he could rightly have said of himself that he made the whole world cry over the beauty of his native land.

Marc Chagall's lithograph to Gogol's poem "Dead Souls."

The prominent Soviet art critic Abram Effross observed that Chagall's impassioned dynamism was best expressed in his graphic works, for that is the most universal art form, closer to thought than to emotion, to narrative than to poetry, and one that sums up the main characteristics of an artist. Marc Chagall presented him with one of the finest self-portraits shown at the exhibition.

His early and still imperfect works of 1914-16, "The Wounded Soldier," "The Vitebsk Railway Station," and "The Old Man and the Old Woman," held the promise that his graphic work would one day be on a par with, if not superior to, his painting. He mastered the art of etching in 1922 in Berlin where, commissioned by a Berlin publisher, he illustrated his autobiography, "My Life" with drawings and etchings. The book, dedicated to "my parents, my wife, and my native town," was published later in Paris. An album of twenty of his etchings was published in Berlin in 1923.

He spent much time doing graphic work, and his fame as a graphic artist reached Paris. Ambroise Vollard, the collector and publisher, commissioned him to do illustrations to Gogol's poem, "Dead Souls." The phantasmagory of Chichikov's scheme in a weird country, where there is no logic, and where madness and incongruity alone can save, is a field that could be ploughed by Chagall far better than by others, for his imagination is wild and his visions, characterized by a satirical spirit, possess elemental force.

In one of the etchings Chagall showed himself next to Gogol. Two elements met and two talents dovetailed, bringing forth 96 lithographs for Gogol's poem, often called the "Russian Iliad." The artist donated the whole series to the Tretyakov Gallery with the dedication, "With all the love of a Russian artist for his motherland." It would be wonderful if Gogol's poem was published here with Chagall's illustrations.

Later on, Ambroise Vollard offered Chagall a commission to illustrate La Fontaine's "Fables," a masterpiece of humour and elegance shown at the exhibition. On commission from him Chagall also illustrated the Bible which, much as it is to be regretted, is not shown. Chagall is considered one of the best illustrators of the Bible. He was awarded the first prize for his graphic work at the Venice Biennale in 1948.

Romantic poet

Among the graphic works on display is a series of lithographs dedicated to Vladimir Mayakovsky who presented the artist, in turn, with a book of his poetry with a pun of a dedication roughly translatable as "May God give it to one and all, the rapid gait of one Chagall." There was no close friendship between them and in fact they were totally different, but both served two muses, poetry and painting. Mayakovsky, the poet, was also an artist and Chagall, the artist, was also a poet.

It would have been strange if Chagall's romantic spirit had not committed itself to paper in verse. Poetry came as naturally to him as breathing.

The one and only country
Is that which lives here in my soul.
As to one's own home, I need no passport to it
And seeing my loneliness and grief
It comforts me....

The series "Circus" provides a clue to yet another passion of Chagall's - colourful magic, joy and merrymaking. He used to say that "circus" is a magic word, a game, thousands of years old, dancing, crying and laughing, the play of limbs turned into a fine art. From time immemorial it has been the piercing cry of anyone seeking carefree pleasure.

Marc Chagall, the master of fairy tales, lived in the real world and responded to its pain and anguish. His art was party to the struggle between good and evil.

"The keys to harmony and happiness are to be sought within ourselves. We hold them in our hands. All I have tried to do is no more than a feeble attempt to challenge cruelty."

Marc Chagall lived in the U.S.A. during World War II and followed his country's resistance to the invading nazis with a proud anxiety. He donated a number of his paintings to a foundation that gave assistance to the Soviet war effort. In a letter "To My Home Town Vitebsk" carried by a New York newspaper in 1944 he said: "...No man will rest while the scorched planet groans."

He extended his exhibition in London in 1985 by a day to collect money for hunger-stricken Ethiopia. It was the last exhibition of his works during his lifetime.

He worked hard for three quarters of a century and left behind him a wealth of paintings, drawings, illustrations, ceramics, murals, stained glass and theatre sets that can be compared only with the enormous legacy of Pablo Picasso.

When he attended the opening of an exhibition of his graphic work at the Tretyakov Gallery in 1973, the 86-year-old artist said, "I do not feel that I am an emigrant at all. It seemed to me that away from my native land I was closer to it and that it is not my fault that I have not physically belonged to it most of the time."

He gave his native land his love, hoping merely for understanding. As he painted the fiddlers and happy lovers floating in the sky, he, perhaps more than any other artist of our time, gave our imaginations wings on which to fly. That is perhaps why Yuri Trifonov said, "Chagall's lovers floating over the city are the epitome of all of us floating in the blue sky of our fate." ■

What are they wearing in Paris

Crowds filled the square in front of the Palais de Chaillot, the space round the Eiffel Tower, and the stands for guests in the Trocadéro gardens. The biggest fashion show in history, the Second International Festival of Fashions, drew 100,000 spectators.

Soviet fashions on parade.

Photos by Y. Inyakin

Though the French, by and large, are not given to doing things on a gigantic scale, the latest fashion show in Paris was the biggest ever of its kind. A 160 metre-long platform stretched across the central cascade of fountains from the Palais de Chaillot to the Seine embankment. The palace itself served as part of the setting. A large screen between its two wings was an extension of the stage. Now desert landscapes, now Japanese decorative motifs were projected onto it.

Fashion designers from 19 countries, among them the Soviet Union, presented their collections. It was the first time that Soviet designers had participated in such a fête.

"Our festival is a sort of fashion Olympics. All continents are represented at it," I was told by the festival's director, promiment Parisian designer Daniel Hechter. "Paris remains the hub of the fashion world, but it does not claim a monopoly on it. The language of fashions is becoming increasingly international... I have benefited much from my recent trip to Moscow. I did not expect to witness such high artistic standards, I must admit. Moscow's collection for the festival was characterized by good taste. And I believe that the reason there are as yet no such clothes in the stores in your country is due to problems in industry, rather than the creativity of your designers..."

It was not accidental that Daniel Hechter attached such importance to the Soviet Union's participation in this fête. Subsequent festivals are planned to be held successively in various countries, and one such show might be held in the Soviet Union in some years' time.

At the Paris festival the Soviet Union was represented by the All-Union Fashion House which has brought 21 ensembles of women's daily wear and clothes for special occasions. The creators of the collections were Tamara Makeyeva, Yulia Denisova, Svetlana Kacharava, Irina Krutikova and Tatyana Osmerkina. The Soviet designers' effective use of a red-and-black colour scheme, their drawing intensively on national motifs, and the simplicity and harmony of their designs produced a favourable impression on the exacting spectators.

"And how did our designers benefit from participation in the festival?" I asked members of the Soviet delegation in Paris.

"It was very instructive to see models by designers from other countries and to analyze their work," said Olga Burmina, artistic director of the children's wear section at the All-Union Fashion House. "I hope that the spectators liked the collections we created expressly for the festival. We set out to reflect in them the traditional costumes of the peoples of the Soviet Union."

...There were neither competitions nor prizes at the festival. Had there been prizes, the first prize would surely have gone to the French designers, and not simply because a good half of the clothes shown were from Parisian fashion houses. The art of fashion comes naturally to the French. It is their national trait and pride. A three-year-old Parisienne, sitting barefoot in a sand-pit, holds herself erect. And though her simple dress may be sand-soiled, she wears it with elegance and grace. Who has taught her this? Her mama? Or is it just a natural way with her?

All the biggest fashion houses in Paris - Yves Saint-Laurent, Nina Ricci, Pierre Balmain, Guy Laroche, Christian Dior, and Jean-Louis Scherrer - showed the latest models of ready-to-wear clothes, haute couture, furs and jewellery.

The show was opened by a parade of a dozen models wearing almost identical, simple close-fitting black dresses with hemlines just grazing the knee. Only the colours of the accessories - gloves, hats, bags or belts - changed, and the clothes seemed to be transformed. Indeed, elegance and beauty are not necessarily synonymous with luxury and wealth. An effective use of details can highlight clothes (even the poodles led on the leash by models in simple white shirts and black trousers enhanced the effect of the ensemble).

The division of roles "for her" and "for him" is very characteristic. In Parisian fashions "elle" must stand out against the background provided for her by "il." Therefore, as distinct from the rich colours of women's clothes, men's garments are in traditional greys and browns, added to which this season are also plaids.

What will this fashion show bring to France?

Local newspapers have been saying that the French fashion industry, which has been one of the country's best foreign currency earners, had started to lose some of its position on the export market. The festival has certainly offered professionals and experts an unprecedented opportunity to familiarize themselves with many collections from the five continents at once. This will surely have a beneficial effect on their work.

To my mind, no less important is the fact that 100,000 Parisians have seen the show and that millions of TV viewers the world over will see the film shot there.

NIKITA YERMAKOV
Paris

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Published in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Polish and Czech ● Telex: 411164a NEWT SU, 411164b NEWT SU, 411164c NEWT SU ● Cables: New Times Pushkin Square Moscow ● Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics





Love, fidelity, the unsteady but constantly burning light of the candle—the light of hope. And valour. Rus—generous, strong, unbowed by misfortune. As if Russia were looking at itself in Konstantin Vasilyev's canvasses as in a mirror and seeing itself changing and eternal, of yesterday and tomorrow.

For years recognition eluded Vasilyev, and he was denied both professionalism and individuality. Working by day as a decorator, he painted by night. But his first one-man show was a revelation.

He died at the age of 34, leaving behind him over 400 canvasses and drawings. Among them is the series Epic Rus, inspired by the history of Russia with its fairy tales, bylinas, and legends; works devoted to the Great Patriotic war, and a series of pictures on subjects from Scandinavian sagas.

Self-portrait. 1976.
Expectation. 1976.
Invasion. 1973.



Today there are endless queues at the entrance to the Exhibition pavilion of the Nature Protection Society. Only the most persistent can get in. What attracts people to Vasilyev's pictures? Is it the inner fortitude of their personalities? Or purity.... There is a cruel injustice in the fact that we have discovered his art only now, when he is no longer alive.

"How much poetry, love of nature, amazing musicality there are in Vasilyev's pictures! And with what wonderful pictorial skill he managed to express all this!" wrote Nikolai Benua. "I am altogether fascinated by the art of this big true painter."

Rendezvous at the window 1975.

Mermaid. 1965.

Photos by V. Panov



Carnival in Palo de Mayo



Meeting

In the port

INTERNATIONAL CONTEST

MAN AND MANKIND

Nicaraguan reportage

Pavel Bogomolov (U.S.S.R.)

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